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L INfRODUCTION 
As discussed in my previous work in An Insight into Insider 
Trading in G~Tater ChiruL,' Ollna should be considered a late 
starter in terms of its insider trading regulatory framework in the 
Greater China region (compared with Hong Kong and Taiwan). As 
the Chinese equity market becomes one of the major stock markets 
in the Asia Pacific region, Ollnese legal authorities have started to 
become aware of the importance of an insider trading regulatory 
framework in order to facilitate its equity market into a healthy in-
vestment environment for investors around the world. 
ln recognizing its importance, Chinese legal authority not only 
introduced Security Law in 2005, which provided a mechanism that 
made it possible for people to bring civil action for losses due to 
insider trading, but the Supreme Court of China also prescribed 
"Standing for Legal Action.~ Within the provisions, it stipulated the 
dispute of insider trading of securities and manipulation of the se-
curities trading.2 Thus, the formal legal foundation of actions taken 
for insider trading was finally established. 
In 2007, China's Securities Regulatory Commission (CSRC) 
prescribed "the ways to recognize insider trading" on a trial basis. 
In addition, the Supreme Court also initiated the interpretation and 
drafting for cases with insider trading and market manipulation.3 
According to the new "Securities Law", securities fraud in-
cludes three categories: false statements, insider trading, and mar-
ket manipulation.• Civil actions can be brought against all three of 
these forms. However, in practice, the court only accepts false state-
ments when every action on securities fraud arises. Insider trading. 
market manipulation, and other causes of civil compensation cases 
are "temporarily not being accepted". 
Jn reality, the regulatory framework for insider trading should 
be a growing mechanism and be amended with the growth of the 
equity market. As China's equity market grows into an important 
equity market in the financial world, China's original regulatory 
framework for insider trading has become inadequate. As a result, 
the focus of this paper aims to examine the recent insider trading 
I. Greg Tzu Jan Yang" An lnsig)lt into ln>ider Tradon& on G"'ater Otina", Mary· 
land Series in Contemporary Asian Studies, No. I - 2010 (200). Baltimore: University 
of Maryland Scllool of Law. 
2. OH Bi Lan, "The F'trSt Serious Case of Insider Tradina", Lepl Rules aod Dem· 
ocratic Times, Oclober 13, 2008. p. 2. 
3. lbitL 
4. Ibid. 
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cases in China and tries to provide new perspectives on the Chinese 
regulatory framework. on insider trading in comparison with recent 
insider trading developments in the United States. 
11. RECENT REGULA TORY DEVELOPMENT 
The growing importance of China's equity market can be seen 
by its growing number of Initial Public Offerings (IPO) listing in 
2010. Even though China's stock market has underperformed com-
pared to the global equity market in 2010, China replaced the U.S. 
and Brazil to become the most active new IPO listing market. For 
the first half of 2010, there were a total of 175 I POs in the Shanghai 
and Shenzhen stock market, averaging 1.5 lPO per day, receiving 
RMB$323.8 billion from the market (USD$1 = RMB$6.3577 as of 
August, 2012).' The growing number of IPOs is due to the Chinese 
government actively encouraging small to medium sized companies 
to be listed in the Shenzhen Growth Enterprise Market (GEM) or 
Shanghai Stock Exchange Small & Medium Enterprises Com-
posites (SSE SME). This in tum has made China's A-shares to be 
listed the most IPOs in the world.6 
On the other side of the coin, this growing number of IPO list· 
ings has created a new class of wealthy people who gained wealth 
by listing their company in exchange for capital from the equiry 
market. On average, during the first half of 2010, China created 600 
bil lionaires from IPO listings (which means 1.5 billionaires were 
created every day).' As a result, the growing number of wealthy 
people with easy access to market capital created a breeding envi-
ronment for insider trading activities. This is because the expected 
IPO stock rally often provided a mechanism for company owners 
and major shareholders to drastically increase their wealth over-
night, therefore increasing the temptation for people to engage in 
insider trading as it is human nature for rich people to want to be· 
come richer. 
In recognizing the inadequacy in its insider trading regulatory 
framework, China's Securities Regulatory Commission (CSRC) in 
July 29, 2010 decided to launch the Interim Provisions on the Securi-
ties Investment Advisor Business and Tentative Provisions for lssu-
S. Bloomberg PrOie$SiOnal System, Bloomberg Finance LP. USA. 
6. CHENG Hui Yuen •· Active IPO Listing: China is in the Middle ol Wealth Crea· 
lion l'rocess" (2010) Wanl Daily, Taipei, Taiwan. 8 Augu51, AS. 
7. CllENG Hui Yuen "ACiive JPO LiSiing: Chinn is In I he MiddleofWeallh Crea· 
lion Proce•s" (2010) Wanl Daily, Taipei, Taiwan, 8 Augusl. AS. 
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ance of Securities-related Research Reports, to further regulate the 
investment environment in China.8 
Within the Interim Provisions on the Securities Investment Ad-
visor Business, securities consulting companies should not provide, 
buy, or seU advice for particular securities on TV, Internet, radio, or 
any other publications. This is to prevent securities consulting ana-
lysts or companies from profiting by advice given to the investor 
regarding buying or seUing particular stocks. Also, within this In-
terim Provisions on the Securities Investment Advisor Business, se-
curities companies who engage in business related to securities or 
investment consultation is forbidden from engaging in the related 
business of proprietary trading or asset management.9 This prevents 
securities consulting companies from engaging in opposite trades 
with their client hence profiting at the loss of their client. 
The Interim Provisions on the Release of Securities Research 
Reports is focused on regulating the research reports published by 
securities companies. When issuing a research report on a particular 
company, the regulation requires securities companies to announce 
the amount of the particular shares the company held on hand. 
Also, on the research report published date and the next trading 
date, the company proprietary department can not engage in trades 
in opposite with the recommendation from the research report.10 
The new regulations focus on regulating the publication of research 
reports from disclosing insider information or atlowing their clients 
to counter trades in the market and profiting from the general in-
vestments publics. This regulation is to focus on the independence 
of the information in research report. 
Also, under the growth and development of China's stock, 
there are a growing number of criminal cases on insider trading 
over recent years. Up to 2011, there were a total of twenty-two 
cases on insider trading being closed. There was one case in 2IXJ7, 
one case in 2008, four cases in 2009, five cases in 2010, and eleven 
cases in 2011. This indicates that insider trading cases have grown at 
an exponential rate in China over the past few years. As a result, 
this had led the Supreme People's Court to declare in May 22, 2012 
that they decided to introduce a new regulation regarding insider 
trading the Interpretation on Several Issues Concerning the Specific 
8. CHEN Shu Lan "China Introduce New Regulations ro Prevent Stock Price Ma· 
nipulation from Stock Analysts" (2010) Want Daily. Taipei. Taiwan. 8 August. A5. 
9. Ibid . . 
10. CHEN Shu Lan "China Introduce New Regulations to Pre\·ent Stock Price Ma· 
nipulatio.n from Stock Analysts" (2010) Want Daily. Taipei, Taiwan. 8 August, A5. 
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Application of Law in Handling the Criminal Cases of Insider Trod· 
ing and Divulgement of Insider Information {hereinafter referred to 
as "the Interpretation of Insider Trading") on June 1, 2012. There 
are eleven sections in the Interpretation of Insider Trading and this 
wiU provide a systematic regulatory framework focus on regulating 
people with inside information, people receiving inside information 
illegally, and sensitive time span for inside information, insider 
trading and the punishment for leaking inside information." 
The introduction of this new regulation should be regarded as 
a big step for the Chinese regulation framework in recognizing the 
importance and significance of insider trading. Besides introducing 
new regulations, the development of a few insider trading cases has 
also made the Chinese regulatory framework more comprehensive 
and complete in recent years. In the foUowing sections, we wiU dis-
cuss the development of a few important insider trading cases in 
China in recent years. Besides the case on HUANG Guangyu, there 
are a few new important cases that have developed in recent years, 
the Qingdao King king and Guo yuan Securities. Also, we will closely 
examine the dealing of sheU listing in Chinese companies, as it has 
become a popular mechanism for quick IPO listing in China, which 
led to many insider trading activities as a consequence. On the 
other hand, we will also use the case on Raj Rajaratnam in the 
United States to compare and contrast with Chinese insider cases to 
illustrate how insider trading cases are being dealt with in a devel-
oped financial market. 
m. CASES OF INSIDER TRADING IN CHINA 
A. HUANG Guangyu: Refreshing on the Case Details 
As the detail of the HUANG Guangyu case was discussed in 
my precious work, An Insight into Insider Trading in Greater China, 
we will only briefly go over a few important points on this case: 
- HUANG Guangyu, chairman of Gome Electrical Appliances 
Holdings Ltd, (Gome) China's biggest electrical appliance 
retailer, was arrested by Beijing Police in late November 
2008. 
- From 2006, after two years of investigation, the police un-
covered evidence of RMB$70 billion in suspicious capital 
transactions under Huang's name, and linked him with fi. 
nancial misdeeds including share price manipulation and 
money laundering. 
11. People's Daily, http://www.people.oom.cn. May 22, 2012, China. 
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- On the same day, officials from the CSRC confirmed that 
Beijing Eagle Investment Co Ltd- a company controlled by 
Huang - was suspected of manipulating share prices of San-
/ian Commercial Co Ltd (Sanlian), and Beijing Centergate 
Technologies Co Ltd (Beijing Centergate ).12 
- Huang was investigated for seven financial crimes such as 
bribing senior officials before Gome's listing in Hong Kong, 
evading taxes by injecting assets into an overseas shell com-
pany during Gome's merger with Shanghai-based electronics 
retailer Yongle; money laundering concerning Shandong 
Jintai; manipulating the share prices of Beijing Centergate 
Technologies and San/ian Commercial; and transferring 
company assets through an underground banking system to 
his own accounts. 13 
- On August 2008, the Central Commission for Discipline In-
spection of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) launched a 
stormy investigation into high-level corruption in the foreign 
investment administration. Several Ministry of Commerce 
(MOFCOM) officials were forced to step down and 
HUANG Guangyu's name came up during the investigation. 
People close to the investigation said that some officials con-
fessed to accepting bribes from Huang before Gome's listing 
in Hong Kong and during its merger with Yongle.14 
- What's more, MOFCOM's approval of the merger was sur-
prisingly swifr. As it was registered on the British Virgin Is-
lands (BVI), Gome was actually a foreign invested company. 
Therefore, it was very unusual for MOFCOM to llave spent 
only eight days on the reviewing process for a merger in-
volved a foreign invested company. As it was later being dis-
covered, two of the MOFCOM officials under investigation 
- GUO Jingyi, inspector of the Department of Treaty and 
Law, and DENG Zhan, former deputy director of the De-
partment of Foreign Investment Administration - played a 
key role in the approval of the merger.1s 
12. Y AN Pei, "Dead End for a Tycoon's Creati\•e Financing", http://www.cbina.org. 
en, December 3, 2008. 
13. Caijiog Magazine, bup:l/www.englisb.caijing.com.cn, December 11, 2008. 
14. Y AN Pei, "Dead End for a Tycoon's Creati,•e Fmancing", http://www.cbina.org. 
en, December 3, 20)8. 
15. Ibid. 
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B. The SheD of Huang 
Besides the above details of Huang's case, HUANG Guangyu 
was one of the early success stories in first shell listing by success-
fully bringing his company Game Electrical Appliances Holding Ltd 
to list in Hong Kong Stock Exchange through shell borrowing list-
ing in 2004. This success in shell listing on IPO made him become 
the number one richest man in China. Due to this early success, 
Huang decided to replicate his early success and engaged in shell 
borrowing listing a few years later. It was the second shell that bad 
brought Huang under investigation and finally his conviction. Even 
though the details of shell borrowing and making listing will be dis-
cussed in a later section, the details on bow Huang made his shell 
will be discussed in detail in this section. This is because the impor-
tance of Huang's shell listing process is an important indication that 
led to his insider trading activities and the consequence that led to 
small shareholder/investor's suffering from this case. 
1. The First Shell: 
Huang started his shell listing process by selecting a Hong 
Kong listed company named Jinghua Automation Group. Through 
issuing equity and acquiring new shares, this company acquired 
Huang and his brother's company through reverse acquisition. In 
return, they bad gained control of this company, Jinghua Automa-
tion Group. In July 2002, they changed the name of the company 
into Chi110 Eagle. Huang also established another company named 
Beijing Eagle and be bad 100% control of this company. He then 
established Go me Electrical, which is 65% controlled by Beijing Ea-
gle and be directly owned the remaining 35% interest in Game. 
Then, he established another company named Ocean Town in Brit-
ish Virgin Island and he registered Gome Holding in BVI and bad 
100% control of Ocean Town. From April 2004, Beijing Eagle 
transfered its 65% Game shares to Ocean Town and the Hong 
Kong listed China Eagle acquired Ocean Town hence Chi110 Eagle 
had 65% shares of Game Electrical. Finally, Huang changed China 
Eagle's name into Gome Electrical Applicances and achieved his 
goal in listing in Hong Kong through shell listing.'6 
Game Electrical Appliances bad achieved its goal of public list-
ing through shell listing all the way from Jinghua Automation 
16. CHOW Chin Yen ""The Protection for Small/Medium lnveston; under Shell 
Usting Process'' China Academic Journal Electronic Publishing House. http://www. 
cnki.net, March, 2011. 
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Group to China Eagle and finally Gome Electrical Applianus. For 
HUANG Guangyu, he had gained a huge profit in cash by selling 
his shares of Game on the stock market. On the other band, it is the 
smal l and individual investors who bad suffered during this process. 
This is because in September 2000, Huang or the controlling share-
holders of Jinghuo Automation Group wanted to affirm its control 
of the company and diluted the control of other existing sharehold-
ers and in return issued 31 million new shares at HKD$0.4 to raise 
HKD$11.9 million (USD$1 = HKD$7.7577 as of August, 2012)17 
through private placement. On tbe other hand, the total number of 
shares issued has increased to 188 million shares and share prices 
plummeted from HKD$1.2 in June to HKD$0.6 in September. As 
the new issue of 31 million of new shares only accounted for 19.7% 
of total shares issued (which is below the 20% threshold), new 
shares issued do not need to cease trading in the stock market nor 
receive approval through shareholder meetings. In September 2001, 
Ji.nglwo Amomation Group decided to issue new shares again and 
issued 44.3 million shares at HKD$0.18 and acquired HKD$7.97 
million. Again, the new shares issued were 19.8% and no share-
holder approval was required. This time, the share price plummeted 
to below HKD$0.2.18 As a result, this is the best illustration of the 
interest of small sbareholdersfmvestor being disregarded and 
manipulated by the company controller and major shareholders. 
On the other band, the easy money and quick cash of shell listing 
had increased Huang's appetite for money and became a prelude 
for his later downfall. 
2. The Second Shell: 
As Game had made him tbe richest man in China. Huang de-
cided to push his real estate company into the public capital market 
as well. As a result, he decided to replicate his shell listing success 
for bis real estate property company. In order to find his shell, be 
engaged in a relationship with three different companies. One was 
his brother's company ST Jimai. The other two were the companies 
he controlled: San/ian Commercial Co Ltd, and Beijing Centergate 
Teclmologies Co Ltd .19 
17. Bloomberg Professional Sr>~cm, Bloomberg Futanee LP, USA . 
18. /l>ul. 
19. KAO Shiu Guo ·s-Oft SbeU and Fail on SbeU·, Cbma Acaden:uc: Journal 
Electtonlt Publ.islliQg House, WWW.alkLO<t. 2009. 
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In order to let his real estate business be publicly listed, the 
first shell he approached was Beijing Centergate Technologies Co 
Ltd. Beijing Centergate was publicly listed in 1999 at Shenzhen 
Stock Exchange with capital stock of around 675 million shares. 
Even though Beijing Centergate mostly engaged in research, devel-
opment, and investment on high tech products, its business per-
formance was definitely less than satisfactory. As a result, this had 
brought Beijing Centergate into the vulture eyes of Huang. From 
2006, Huang let his investment company, Beijing Pengtai Invest-
ment, Co Ltd begin to acquire the shares of Beijing Centergate and 
when he acquired up to 29.58% shares, he became a major share-
holder in Beijing Centergate. Through the reverse acquisition he 
had previously done, by May 4, 2008, Beijing Centergate announced 
its acquisition of Huang's Beijing Pengrun Property Development 
Holding Company Limited and hence transformed from a technolo-
gies company into a real estate company. Unfortunately, this acqui-
sition was not successful. Three months later, Beijing Centergate 
announced to abort the plan on acquiring Beijing Pengrun Property 
Development Holding Company Limited. Even though Huang con-
tinued to look for another shell, he had already engaged in insider 
trading by manipulating the share price of Beijing Centergate during 
the shell making process. He first spread bad news about Beijing 
Centergate in the stock market on June 27, 2007 in order for him 
and his affiliated parties to acquire shares of Beijing Centergate at 
low prices. On May 7, 2008, he let Beijing Centergate announce the 
news of company restructuring in order to stimulate a rally in share 
prices. As a result, he sold around RMB$300 million of Beijing 
Centergate shares on May 7 and 8.20 This insider trading activity 
attracted the attention of Chinese regulators and later led to the 
downfall of Huang. 
As the shell making on Beijing Centergate was unsuccessful, 
Huang approached another potential shell, San/ian Commercial Co 
Ltd. In February 14, 2008 Huang approached San/ian by acquiring 
27 million shares of San/ian through his controlled real estate com-
pany, Shandong Long Ji Dao Co Ltd and gained controlled on San-
lion with 19.71% shares. During this process, the news that San/ian 
would become a shell for Huang bad spread in the market. This had 
made the share price and traded volume of San/ian to change tur-
bulently. For example, the traded volume of San/ian on March 10 
was only 34,000 shares. From March 11, the traded volume in-
20. Ibid. 
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creased to 28 million shares and on March 12, to 47 million shares. 
This huge increase in traded volume attracted CSRC's attention 
and they began to investigate San/ian on March 28. This later led to 
the arrest of Huang and the downfall of his money empire?' 
IV. THE JUDGMENT OF HUANG'S CASE 
A. The First Instance Judgment 
After years of investigation and prosecution, on May 18, 2010, 
in the first instance judgment in the HUANG Guangyu's case, Beij-
ing Second Intermediate People's Court issued its judgment: for the 
crime of illegal business dealings, the court sentenced HUANG 
Guangyu to a jail term of 8 years and ordered his personal proper-
ties valued at RMB$200 million to be confiscated; for the crime of 
insider trading, the court sentenced HUANG Guangyu to a jail 
term of 9 years, and ordered fines of RMB$600 million; for the 
crime of corporate bribery, the court sentenced HUANG Guanyu 
to a jail term of 2 years. Upon a joinder of punishment for the 
several counts of the crime, the Court decided to enforce a jail term 
of 14 years, with fines of RMB$600 million and confiscation of per-
sonal property valued at RMB$200 million.22 
As shown from the court judgment, the court focused on three 
major crimes Huang had committed: 
1. Crime of Illegal Business Dealings 
During the period from September 2007 to November 2007, 
Huang had violated relevant state regulations by engaging in illegal 
foreign exchange trading with RMB settlement in the mainland and 
Hong Kong Dollar settlements outside the mainland. The violation 
involves the transfer of RMB$800 million, either directly or through 
Beijing Heng Yi Xiang Business Consulting Company Limited 
(Heng Yi Xiang), to Shenzhen Sheng Feng Yuan Industry Company 
Limited (Sheng Feng Yuan) and other entities, and unauthorized 
exchange and purchase of foreign currency through ZHENG 
Xiaowei (prosecuted under a separate action) and the receipt of 
over HK$822 million (or over US$105 million) in Hong Kong.23 
21. KAO Shiu Guo "Success on SheD and Fail on Shell", China Academic Journal 
EleCironic Publishing House, www.cnki.net. 2009. 
22. The judgment of lbe first instance of HUANG Guangyu case (Full Version) • 
May 18, 2010. btlp:/lfinance.sina.com.cnlstoclc/s/20100519122117970228.sbtml 
23. Ibid. 
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2. Crime of Insider Trading and Divulging of Inside 
Information 
During the period from April 2007 to June 28, 2007, Huang 
abused his official position as the controlling shareholder and direc-
tor of Beijing Centergate Technology Company Limited by deciding 
and ordering others to buy in over 9.76 million Beijing Centergate 
shares in cumulative trading, for a total price of more than 
RMB$93.1 million during the period from April 27, 2007 through 
June 27, 2007 in connection with the contemplated asset swap be-
tween Beijing Centergate and Beijing Eagle, a company operated 
and managed by Huang. The buy transaction was made through 
securities accounts opened in the name of Mr. Long, Mr. Wang and 
another 4 persons, with actual control of Huang, and when the rele-
vant public announcement was made on June 28, 2007, the book 
earnings of the 6 securities accounts stood at more than RMB$3.48 
million.24 
During the period from July or August, 2007 to May 7, 2008, 
Huang decided and ordered others to buy over 104 million Beijing 
Centergate shares in cumulative trading for a total price of more 
than RMB$1.322 billion during the period from August 13·, 2007 
through September 28, 2007 in connection with the contemplated 
100% equity acquisition by Beijing Centergate of Beijing Pengrun 
Property Development Holding Company Limited and related re-
structuring. The buy transaction was made through securities ac-
counts opened in the name of CAO Chujuan, LIN Jiafeng and 
another 77 individuals, the trading through those securities ac-
counts was however under the actual control of Huang, and when 
the relevant public announcement was made on May 7, 2008, the 
book earnings of the 79 securities accounts stood at more than 
RMB$306 million.25 
3. Crime of Corporate Bribery 
As a principal officer of the Defendant Entities Pengrun Prop-
erty and Gome, Huang directed XU Zhongmin to request illegal 
favors from XIANG Huaizhu during the period from 2006 through 
to 2008 in connection with the handling of relevant cases involving 
Pengrun Property and Gome, and Huang offered, or directed XU 
Zhongmin to offer, XIANG Huaizhu payment and other valuables 
24. Ibid. 
25. Ibid . . 
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in a total amount of over RMB$1.06 million on two separate 
occasions.26 
B. The Second Instance Judgment 
The second instance judgment was announced at the court 
house of Beijing Higher People's Court the morning of August 30, 
2010. The court upheld the first instance court ruling of joinder 
punishment for the three counts of offences of Huang, including a 
jail term of 14 years, with fines and confiscation of properties total-
ing RMB$800 million. The first instance ruling against Huang's 
wife, DU Juan, was revised to probation for a jail term of 3 years 
with stayed execution, and was released at the courthouse.27 
C. The Final Judgment from the Supreme People's Court 
The China Supreme People's Court on May 22, 2012 declared 
their sentence on HUANG Guangyu and his wife DU Juan. The 
sentence on Huang was retained at jail term of 14 years, but fines 
were revised to RMB$600 million and confiscation of properties to-
taling RMB$200 million. For Huang's wife DU Juan, her jail term 
was increased to 3 years and 6 months with fines of RMB$200 
milli 28 on. 
In this case, HUANG Guangyu was sentenced to a jail term of 
14 years, and he is currently serving the sentence. The end of this 
case should serve to be the beginning of insider trading regulatory 
awareness in China. The most relevant issue for this case is that it 
has raised the awareness for the interest of small/medium investors 
in China. 
V. ISSUES FOR THE INVESTORS IN CHINA 
After the court sentenced judgments for respective defendants 
from Huang's case, we should not forget there is another important 
party involved, the shareholder/investors. Shareholders are another 
major party who suffered in cases such as HUANG Guangyu, as the 
share price of Gome had plummeted during the period of this case. 
Besides Gome shareholders, other companies involved in this case 
are also public trading companies such as Yongle, San/ian Commer-
cial and Beijing Centergate and their share prices also reacted turbu-
26. Ibid. 
27. The judgment of the second instance of Huang Guangyu case, Report. August 
30, 2010. http://finanoe.sina.eom.cn/stockltshgy/index.shtml 
28. People's Daily, http1/www.people.oom.cn, May 22. 12, China. 
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lently during the proceeding of this case.29 1n other words, there 
should be a large number of shareholder/investors who had suf-
fered losses under the insider trading dealings of this case. As illus-
trated in Huang's case, this is the infamous consequence of sheU 
listing as it is usually the smalllmedium shareholders/investors that 
suffer the most when insider trading occurred under sheU listing. 
This is because the unfair and non-transparency of information usu-
aUy led the major shareholder or company controUer such as Huang 
to make substantial and unlawful profit at the expense of individual 
shareholders/investors. 
In order to address this issue, pursuant to the Civil Procedural 
Law of the People's Republic of China, the court at the domicile of 
the plaintiff, i.e. shareholders who had suffered losses, shall have 
jurisdiction. However, in the Huang's case, tens of thousands of 
shareholders suffered losses as a result of Huang's insider trading, 
and were the courts at the domicile of the plaintiffs to have jurisdic-
tion, there would be dozens of courts around the country that 
would docket the case and try the insider trading case against 
Huang. Due to the differing levels of trial quality and the varying 
standards applied, the results of the individual trials would differ 
significantly for this new type of case involving civil compensation 
for victims of insider trading, which is bad for maintaining the au-
thority of court judgments, not to say the great waste of judicial 
resources. Therefore, there should be a single court to try and exer-
cise jurisdiction over the claim. Tentatively, the trial court of the 
case could be the court at the domicile of the defendant.30 
If the Beijing Second Intermediate People's Court is to have 
jurisdiction over the civil compensation case for the insider trading 
offence, it would facilitate the finding of facts and the safeguarding 
of the legitimate interests of the investors. In light of the Huang's 
case, some people suggest that as Huang has permanent domicile in 
Hong Kong, and the first instance trial of the criminal case for the 
insider trading offence was made by the Beijing Second Intermedi-
ate People's Court. Therefore, Beijing Second Intermediate Peo-
ple's Court is the most appropriate forum?' 
29. Bloomberg Professional System: Bloomberg Finance LP. USA: Beijing Center-
gate Tecbnologie's share prioe bas plummeted from Ihe blghest of RMB$17.8 in May 
2008. all the way down to RMB$2.48 on November 4. And it has 130,000 shareholders. 
30. "From Final Ruling of Huang's Case to Disscuss the Issue of Civil Compensa· 
tion for Insider Trading" hup:/lblog.p5w.netl?uid·382&5().action-viewspace-itemid-348 
215. Janurary 29, 2011 (Interview) 
31. Ibid. 
INSIDER TRADING IN CHINA 15 
Now that we have addressed the issue of proper forum, let's 
look at another important issue, i.e. plaintiffs with good standing, in 
other words, which investors have the right to bring a compensation 
claim? Are all shareholders who sold shares during these two peri-
ods plaintiffs with good standing? 
The Securities Law of 2005 has no explicit provisions regarding 
the scope of the plaintiffs, and it only provides that "where the in-
sider trading causes losses to investors, the offender shall be held 
duly liable for indemnification".32 Should the word "investor" be 
given a broad meaning or a narrow meaning, does the word "inves-
tor" only include natural persons or also include victimized invest-
ment companies? If China wants to establish a more 
comprehensive framework of insider trading regulation, then the 
scope of qualified investors should be expanded to include victim-
ized investment companies, because the purpose of compensation 
for insider trading offenses is to indemnify the victims, and punish 
the offender, and no distinction was made between natural person 
and corporations. 
Specifically, according to the Criminal Judgment, it was during 
the period from April27, 2007 to June 27,2007 and the period from 
August 13, 2007 to September 28, 2007, the two price sensitivity 
periods, that Huang bought in huge amounts of Beijing Centergate 
stocks. Therefore, only shareholders who sold Beijing Centergate 
shares during these two periods might qualify as plaintiffs to claim 
against Huang; however, not all shareholders who sold shares dur-
ing these periods are plaintiffs with good standing. Only sharehold-
ers who executed reverse trading as compared to that of Huang 
have good standing. It is worth stressing that "shareholders who 
executed reverse trading as compared to that of an insider" include 
all shareholders who executed reverse trading when the insider exe-
cuted insider trading, and are not limited to counterparty to the 
executed share transactions of the insider. However, as the rele-
vant authorities have not released the relevant information about 
Huang's insider trading, it is currently impossible to pinpoint the 
timing of Huang's purchase of shares. In this case, investors can 
analyze the trading volume of Beijing Centregate shares during 
these periods, especially during the period from August 13, 2007 to 
September 28, 2007 for any trading abnormality, and listed the rele-
vant time windows, and investors who sold Beijing Centergare 
32. Securities Times, China, .. Issues on the Indemnification of Insider Trading from 
the Huang Guangyu Case" October 16, 2010. 
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stocks during those time windows may bring an action against 
Huang as a reference.'3 
A. Method of Litigation 
According to preliminary statistics, tens of thousands of inves-
tors are victims of Huang's insider trading. With such a large group 
of plaintiffs, which method of litigation would be more appropri-
ate? The investors could be classified by their present state of mind 
as foUows: (1) investors who are unaware of their right to sue 
Huang; (2) investors who are aware of such rights, but are not sure 
of the probability of winning the case, and they would rather stay as 
is if they could not recover losses through a lawsuit instead of incur-
ring more litigation costs; and (3) investors who are not sure 
whether they could win the case, but are engaging a lawyer to try. 
The statistics show that the ratio of investors who are prepared to 
bring a lawsuit never topped 0.5% of the total number of share-
holders, and most investors would rather not sue.34 
Investors suffered heavily as a consequence of this grave viola-
tion, then why are they choosing to waive the right of action? This 
may serve to be one of the weaknesses in the litigation mechanism 
in China. Pursuant to the Civil Procedural Law, where either side 
to an action is comprised of two or more parties and the subject 
matter of the litigation are identical or of the same type, joint litiga-
tion may be used. However, such joint litigation is only suitable 
where the identities of the plaintiffs are clear-cut, and the number 
of plaintiffs is relatively modest. A joint litigation could not work as 
weU for such insider trading cases as the Huang's case where tens of 
thousands of plaintiffs are involved. 
If joint litigation may not be an effective mechanism, some sug-
gest the adoption of class actions. Class actions is a common inves-
tor protection mechanism in the United States and does have many 
advantages in bringing claims in massive tort cases, including trial 
economy, which helps avoid the exorbitant costs of individual ac-
tion; deterrence, the massive damages payable in a class action 
helps prevent torts from occurring; protection of defendant, which 
helps protect the defendant from multiple punishment and from be-
33. Securities Times., China, ••tssues on the Indemnification of Insider Trading from 
the HUANG Guangyu Case" October 16. 2010. 
34. "Civil Compensation from Insider Trading from Huang's Caes''. hnp~lteeh. 
ifeng.com/ilfspe<:iaUconirolgorneloonteni·1/detaiL2010_0911812550894_1.shtml. Febru· 
Bf)' 1. 2011 (lnierview). 
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ing overwhelmed with answering lawsuits. However, class action 
also has many shortcomings. First of all, class actions consume con-
siderable time and costs, and in the U.S., only 8% of class actions 
could be concluded within one year, and only 2% to 3% completed 
the trial proceedings and a substantial part of the disputes are re-
solved by mediation or settlement. Second, class actions are led by 
lawyers designated by the judges, and the prospect of large legal 
fees often induced by the lawyers, for ulterior motives, to work with 
the defendant's counsel to settle with the plaintiffs, and the judges 
could not find a representative or lawyer who could truly represent 
the class. Third, massive damages and the involvement of huge 
amounts of resources, manpower and money often made the de-
fendants unable to continue operations, or even file for 
bankruptcy.35 
Therefore, we should not directly copy the United States ver-
sion of class action as it is, rather, we should adopt the rational 
elements of the class action method, and incorporate them into the 
joint action method of litigation that China already has, which in 
tum serves to be an effective recovery mechanism of insider trading 
losses, and promote the growth of the investor interests. 
Also, we may suggest the use of representative action provided 
by Civil Procedural Law. However, the Several Circulars of the Su-
preme People's Court regarding the Trial of Civil Compensation 
Cases arising from False Representations in the Securities Market 
dated January 9, 2003 excluded representative action, and that is 
why representative action is rarely mentioned in connection with 
the trial of securities market cases.36 
However, in addressing civil compensation cases arising from 
insider trading, such representative action, with indefinite number 
of parties on either side is suitable in several aspects: 
(I) Representative action involving an indefinite number of 
participants as provided for in the Civil Procedural Law is 
suitable for cases involving the same type of subject mat-
ter, with many participants the number of whom could not 
be defined at the time of action. A vast majority of insider 
trading compensation cases meet such conditions; 
(2) Representative actions have advantages for the trial of in-
sider trading compensation cases as the following: 
3.5. LUI Jen "from OIENO Boi Wen's Case to See the CompcnsollOII got QviJ 
ACIIOII m Otino"Otino ruoance. 2006, luue 4, 
:16. Ibid. 
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a. In a representative action, the court could issue public 
announcements with a description of the case back-
ground and the claims, asking the right holders to regis-
ter their rights and join the action, whereby truly 
encompassing various disputes into one proceeding for 
simultaneous resolution, which saves judicial costs and 
improves litigation efficiency. 
b. In a representative action, the method for the nomina-
tion of representatives are flexible, improving the likeli-
hood of representative action, cutting the litigation 
costs of the parties and avoiding the litigation burdens 
of the defendant (mainly listed companies and their re-
sponsible persons). 
c. The judgment in a representative action could be ex-
panded to apply to other stakeholders of the company 
involved besides shareholders who did not register their 
rights, ensuring the disputes are resolved once for aU. 
Therefore, the legislation should make it possible for resolu· 
tion of civil compensation cases for insider trading by way of repre-
sentative actions, which will help reduce litigation costs, improve 
litigation efficiency and maintain justice in the lit.igation process." 
B. Standard or Compensation 
An American scholar, Richard Posner, believes that civil com-
pensation for securities offences are justified for two reasons. First, 
it provides incentives for victims to bring an action, because litiga-
tion is necessary in order to maintain the tort system as an effective 
deterrence against misdemeanors; second, it prevents the victims 
from taking excessive preventive measures.38 This also points to 
the principles for the scope of compensation for securities related 
offences. first, the system is designed to provide adequate protec-
tion for the rights and interests of the investors on the basis of the 
causal effect between investment losses and insider trading, and 
holding and punishing the insider traders with civil liabilities, to 
prevent and deter insider trading; second, there shall be appropri-
ate limitations of compensation liability, to prevent excessive deter-
37. CHIN Yen Yen "Resean:b on Ctwil Compeosa1ion from Sccunlits Martel", 
law and Social Oe,·elopmcnl. Cb•na. 2008. Issue 4. 
38. Ricll3rd Posne.. OtiANG Yi Kang (uanslate). "The Ecooocruc Analysis of 
Law" CIHna Eneydoped•a Pubhshma Company. t99?, p.246 
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renee due to enormous compensation, as this will have a negative 
impact on social and economic development. 
Some argue that the amount of compensation to investors 
should be calculated based on the earnings of the offender, for in-
stance, in Huang's case, as of the announcement of relevant infor-
mation, the book earnings of the securities accounts used by Huang 
for the insider trading stood at over RMB$306 million, which 
should be the amount compensated to the investors, however, this 
method of calculation is not practicable for each investor and is 
broad in scope.39 Therefore, the actual loss of each investor should 
be the basis for calculation of compensation. 
The actual losses of investors include both direct losses, such as 
the losses due to the drop or rise of share prices, including relevant 
commission, stamp duty and closing costs, and indirect losses, in-
cluding loss of interest, legal fees, litigation costs, travel expenses 
and cost of absence from work . .w The current civil compensation 
regulations for violations in the securities market only stated the 
defrauder's liability for compensation of direct losses of investors, 
and ignored the investors' indirect losses, which is worthy of 
attention. 
These are the primary methods for calculation of direct losses: 
(1) Actual value method: The amount of compensation is the 
difference between the actual price of the trading and the 
actual value of the securities at the time of such trading. 
For example, if an investor bought the concerned securities 
at RMB$10 per share at the time of the insider trading, 
while the actual value of the securities is RMB$8 per share 
at the time, the difference would be RMB$2. However, 
under this method, the difficulty lies with the calculation of 
the actual market value of the securities at the time of the 
insider trading. 
(2) Calculation based on the actual cause, under which the in-
sider trader is responsible for compensation against securi-
ties flucruations caused by its trading activities, and that 
caused by other factors is not the responsibility of the in-
sider trader. For instance, if an investor bought the con-
39. "Discussion on 8 Major Problems on lhe Civil Compensation for tbe case of 
HUANG Guangyu" bttp:Jifmance.jrj.oom.cnlbiz/2010/09Al713438116630.shnnl, January 
23, 2011 (loterview). 
40. HSIANG Yi Tsai, HU Wen Hsin & CHANG Yi "The Determination for lhe 
Amount of Civil Compensation from Security Litigation" China Market Journal, Issue 
52, '21X17. 
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cemed securities at RMB$10 per share at the time of 
insider trading, and after announcement of the inside in-
formation, the price of the securities is RMB$8 per share, 
and of the RMB$2 drop in per share price of the securities, 
RMB$1 is caused due to system risks, and RMB$1 is 
caused due to the insider trading, the insider trader will 
only be responsible for the RMB$1 caused due to their ac-
tions. The difficulties with this method are how to distin-
guish insider trading action from other factors. 
(3) Differential price method: The amount of compensation is 
equal to the difference between the trading price and the 
share price at the time of announcement of the inside in-
formation or shortly after. The difficulties with this 
method are that it is hard to determine the time of an-
nouncement of the inside information and a reasonable pe-
riod of time shortly thereafter.41 
Among the above methods of calculation, the method of actual 
value is easier to use, and in practice, the actual value is determined 
based on the average price over a period of time, and tend to be 
adopted by courts and legislative authorities. 
In Huang's case, the court used the closing price on the date of 
announcement of the relevant information as the basis for calcula-
tion of the gains made by Huang, and the investors could also use 
this method, i.e. the losses are calculated based on the difference 
between the closing price at the date of announcement and the sale 
price. 
C Evidence 
The question of providing evidence for insider trading cases 
has always been a tricky issue as discussed in the previous work on 
An Insight into Insider Trading in Greater China, and in principle 
the burden of proof could be reversed, and for special cases of in-
sider trading, some auxiliary measures may be taken.42 
In fact, many of the insider trading cases was discovered by 
investigation into corporate briberies. For instance, in the Huang's 
case, XIANG Huaizhu, the then vice director of the Economic 
Crime Investigation Department of the Ministry of Public Security 
41. YANG Feng .. Discussion on Determination for Compensation for Losses from 
Insider Trading'' Jinan Academic Journal. Issue 6. 2006. 
42. Greg Tzu Jan Yang '"An Insight into Insider Trading in Greater Olina" Mary-
land Series in Contemporary Asian Studies. No. I - 2010(200} 
iNSIDER TRADING IN CHINA 21 
and Head of Beijing Brigade for the Securities Crime Investigation, 
learned of inside information during the course of Huang's manipu-
lation of Beijing Centergate shares, and boupt Beijing Centergate 
shares in reliance of the inside information.• However during the 
trial against XIANG Huaizhu before Beijing Second Intermediate 
People's Court, the insider trading was not touched upon and it was 
the issue of bribery being focused for Xiang. 
Therefore, a reward mechanism may be adopted for reporting 
of crimes, i.e. offering rewards to persons who report the offense. 
In addition, the employees of relevant securities regulatory authori-
ties may be requested to appear before the court, or to provide rel-
evant information as a witness for the prosecution. 
D. Recovery of Damages 
The facts of Huang's insider trading are clear, and the evidence 
is concrete, and there is no significant contention thereof, but if an 
adverse judgment in the civil compensation case is rendered against 
Huang, how will the recovery of damages end up? Would the once 
wealthiest person in China be able to deliver the compensation, and 
will the investors lose money despite their success in the case? 
The investors should not be concerned with this issue, as the 
relevant regulations in China provide that civil compensations have 
priority over administrative and criminal fines.44 The judicial au-
thority has confiscated the Beijing Centergate shares, over 100 mil-
lion shares in total, bought by Huang and his affiliated parties, 
which, at the recent average price of Beijing Centergate shares at 
RMBSS per share, is valued at nearly RMB$900 million. If the 
court renders a favorable ruling for the plaintiffs in the civil com-
pensation case, the confiscated shares would be adequate to com-
pensate the claims of the investors, therefore recovery of damages 
amount would not be a concern in this case. 
After years of criminal proceedings, Huang's insider trading 
case is basically settled, but the civil compensation proceeding has 
just begun. Huang's insider trading case is relevant as it is unprece-
dented in terms of the amounts, the scope and consequences, and is 
an important landmark in the development of the capital market in 
China. The analysis of the Huang case is not a mere analysis of the 
case itself or HUANG Guangyu the person, it is actually an analysis 
of the roads for safeguarding the interests of investors victimized by 
43. The verdict of tbe initial trial of HUANG Gua~ case • May 18, 2010. 
44. Article 207 of tbe "Security Law" and Article 14 of the "Torts Law". 
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insider trading, and is a summary of the common issues in the com-
pensation cases against insider trading, to derive from the analysis 
reasonable solutions. Jurisprudence is not science, but the scientific 
method could be used to analyze legal issues and arrive at a scien-
tific solution, which is also the purpose of our analysis. 
VI. CASE ON QINGDAO KINGKING 
AND GUOYUAN SECURITIES 
Even though the case on HUANG Guangyu had closed, in-
sider trading cases continue to flourish in China's financial market 
in recent years. Not only has the structure of the cases become 
more complicated, but the scale and monetary profit involved also 
exceed Huang's case. For example, the case on Qingdao Kingking 
Applied Chemistry Co Ltd (Qingdao Kingking) and Guoyuan Se-
curities should be considered a good example for insider trading 
cases in the post HUANG Guangyu era. Even though Qingdao 
Kingking and Guoyuan Securities are independent companies, they 
are related because they are both insider trading cases committed 
by the same person, SHIAO Shih Ching. 
A. Backgrounds 
The illegal structure for this case involves two major players, 
WANG Yi and SHIAO Shih Ching. They used to be members of 
China's CSRC, as CSRC was the governing body of the China se-
curity market; they use the connection and convenience of their po-
sition to gain insider information in profiting from the IPO of 
Qingdao Kingking Applied Chemistry Co Ltd and the corporate re-
structuring of Hunan Jiuzhitang Co Ltd. They are not only profiting 
for themselves, they have a group of affiliated parties to share the 
profit.45 
As for Shiao, his profit from insider trading on the Guoyuan 
Securities had profited him more than RMB$100 million. This is a 
record breaking figure for the profit received from officials on in-
sider trading cases. In other words, Shiao had used the convenience 
of his connections and position to commit two major insider trading 
cases that had profited him handsomely. One is Qingdao Kingking 
and the other is Guoyuan Securities.46 
45. TAN Yi Fei & CHANG Lu '"The Reality of Shiao Shih Ching's Financial Deal-
ing" (2011) CAACNews, China, May 13, Issue 4076, Pl. 
46. Ibid. 
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B. Facts oo Qmgdao Klngking 
Qingdao Kingking originally was a Chinese artifact manufac-
turing company with capital of only USD$200,000. As its Chairman 
CHEN Sou Bing wanted his company to go public, the company 
expanded its capital to RMB$31.02 million on April 10, 2011. As 
Chen learned that his company does not quite qualify under the 
IPO criteria and regulatory body Development and Reform Com-
mission rejected its IPO application, be approached the owner of 
Tianching Ying Shun, WANG Lai for assistance. Wbo is WANG 
Lai? He is CSRC vice chairman WANG Yi's brother. Due to his 
brother's position in CSRC. WANG Lai and his sister WANG Wei 
established Tianching Ying Shun on June 28, 2001 to provide tech-
nology development and investment consulting services with capital 
of RMB$5 million.47 The consulting services they provided usually 
focused on solving problems for companies who have troubles in 
qualifying or fulfilling CSRC's regulations or requirements. They 
will help these companies resolve their problems with CSRC using 
convenient and creative ways. On the other hand, they charge a 
handsome fee for sharing profits on IPOs from these companies. 
As the sibling of Wang's family had engaged in a profiting 
framework, WANG Lai and WANG Wei used WANG Yi's position 
to attract business and WANG Yi used his sibli.ng's company as a 
window to receive money from tbe corporate sectors. For example, 
during the period of November 1999 to February 2008, WANG Yi 
had received a bribe of RMB$6.3 million from businessman CHOU 
Hong Ching in return for Chou's convenience in receiving credit 
line from the banks. This amount was received by WANG Lai for 
his brother. As WANG Yi became the vice chairman of CSRC in 
November 1995, he recommended SHIAO Shih Ching join the 
board of CSRC as deputy director - general of department of listed 
company supervision in 1996. Before that, Shiao was only a lecturer 
in the College for officers for Central Fmancial Administration and 
was new to the financial industry.48 
In 2006 Qingdao Kingking was having difficulties fulfilling the 
requirements for IPO, the chairman of Qingdao Kingking sought 
assistance from WANG Lai to resolve the difficulties for him. 
WANG Lai approached Shiao to do this favor for him. Even 
though at that time, Shiao bad already left the CSRC board to be-
47. Ibid. 
.a. lbiil. 
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come the Chairman of Galaxy Securities, but his connections on the 
board were still intact. 
To the market's surprise and with significant assistance from 
Shiao, the next day it was announced that the case for Qingdao 
Kingking IPO was passed and successfully IPO by December 2006 
on the Shenzhen Stock Exchange. On one afternoon on December 
2006, WANG Lai had given a gift of cash RMB$200,000 to Shiao 
for his assistance and this gift was later presented as evidence of 
bribery that Shiao received in this case.49 
C. Fads on Guoyuan Securities 
During Shiao's days as CSRC's deputy director- general of de-
partment of listed company supervision, he learned on 2004 that 
China Petrochemical Corporation (Sinopec) planned to restructure 
its public tracling subsidiary into an integrated public company. By 
2006, Shiao left CSRC and became the chairman in Galaxy Securi-
ties. By that time, Galaxy Securities was acting as financial consult-
ant for Sinopec on the IPO of its subsicliaries. As a result, Shiao 
used this convenience to obtain knowledge on the timetable and 
information for the IPO. By September 2006, he confirmed that Si-
nopac will use Everbright Securities Company Limited as a shell 
(shell listing) for Sinopac subsidiary Beijing Huaer Company Lim· 
ited to IPO. Once this IPO method was confirmed, Shiao used his 
friends and family members as dummy accounts to buy stock of 
Beijing Huaer Company Limited for the amount of RMB$35 mil· 
lion or 430,000 shares between September 21 and 30, 2006. 
On March 14, 2007, Beijing Huaer Company Limited con-
firmed to IPO under Everbright Securities and it will change its 
name to Guoyuan Securities. On October 30, the first trading day of 
Guoyuan Securities, its stock rallied 400% to as high as RMB$50 
and closed at RMB$47.53. This IPO rally had made Shiao a profit 
of around RMB$100 million and the court later demanded Shiao 
and his family members to return profits of RMB$72.5 million as 
unlawful profits.50 
D. Judgments 
The scope and amount of this case were both record high in 
China's financial market and Wang and Shiao bluntly using their 
position and connection in CSRC as a convenient mechanism for 
49. Ibid. 
50. Ibid. 
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profit had attracted attention from the Chinese regulator. On June 
8, 2008 WANG Yi (CSRC ex-Vice Chairman) was taken into cus-
tody by Serious Crimes Squad for investigation. On April 29, 2009, 
SHIAO Shih Ching, the CEO of Galaxy Securities was under inves-
tigation and the investigation focused on his connections with the 
corporate companies and the securities market during his two terms 
as member of the CSRC board. By the end of April 2010, WANG 
Yi was sentenced to death parole for receiving bribes of RMB$11.9 
million by Henan Province People's High Court. By the end of 
April 2011, SHIAO Shih Ching was sentenced to death parole for 
bribery and insider trading at Fmal Instance by Henan Province 
People's High Court. Shiao was guilty for RMB$15.46 million of 
bribery and insider trading profit of RMB$100 million and return 
profit of RMB$72.5 million as unlawful profits. 5 1 
E- Issues from the Cases 
From these cases, we can see the biggest problem that leads to 
the insider trading dealing is the existence of the "amphibian" like 
Shiao and Wang who move between government regulatory bodies 
and securities fi.rms. Unfortunately, they are not the only ones. Ac-
cording to a press survey, there are 28 fund managers in Chinese 
securities firms who used to work in the CSRC.52 They move be-
tween their roles to serve their own interest. On one band, they 
relax regulations and convenience to IPO for their related compa-
nies and on the other hand, they and their faniily members profit 
from the capital market from the insider information. This amphib-
ian role allows them to gain unlawful profit from the insider infor-
mation they obtain as regulatory officials. 
Unfortunately, in a healthy and mature capital market, these 
amphibians are not allowed to exist. Their mere existence opened 
an unfair window in the market and made the capital market imper-
fect and unhealthy. U China wants its capital market to become one 
of the major financial markets in the word like the United States 
and Japan, they should provide restrictions in regulating officials 
who retire or leave CSRC. There should be clear "revolving door 
policies" in restricting ex-CSRC officials to work in securities com-
panies. Also, providing "revolving door policies" is not enough, en-
forcing them is the key. Without effective enforcement and 
punishment, all regulations will become a mere formality. The am-
Sl. Ibid. 
S2. Ibid. 
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phibian problem will continue to exist and the market will continue 
to be unfair. 
F. Issue on Shell Listing 
Besides the amphibian problem, another problem which 
emerged from the cases above was shell-borrowing listing. Shell list-
ing is a common practice in China especially for Chinese companies 
to be listed in the Hong Kong or other stock market. This may be a 
convenient practice for the company to raise capital in the public 
market, but this practice also provides many loopholes for gaining 
insider information and room for insider dealing. As a result, the 
issue of shell listing will be closely examined and discussed as it is at 
present a special characteristic for insider trading cases in China. 
1. What is Shell-borrowing Listing? 
The mechanism of shell listing is often adopted when a Chinese 
company wants to be listed in their local or overseas stock market, 
and choose not to list directly but to buy or borrow the shell of 
another public trading company in that market. There are two ma-
jor types of shell listing. There is the shell-borrowing listing and 
shell-making listing. 
a. Shell-borrowing Listing 
The Chinese company usually chooses an existing listed com-
pany to "borrow" the shell of that company in order to achieve the 
goal of raising capital in the market. The Chinese company will usu-
ally purchase the equity of the borrowed company in order to be-
come the major holder of the company. After they gain control or 
purchase the company, they use the company as a shell for public 
listing. Usually after they purchase the company, they will inject 
their own assets into the shell company and achieve their ultimate 
goal of public listing.'3 Aside from acquiring a separate corporate 
entity for listing, shell borrowing could occur within the corporate 
group. In other words, a parent company could use one if its subsid-
iaries as a shell for listing. The parent company will inject assets and 
capital into the shell subsidiary and restructure it into a holding 
53. ZHANG Yu, "Sample Analysis and Law Regulation to the Coming into Market 
or the Chinese En1erprises Through Sbeii·Borrowing Overseas" Journal or Hebei Uni· 
versity of Economics and Trade. Vol. 21. No. 4, July 2000. 
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company and in turn help the parent company go public as a 
whole. 54 
There are a few advantages for shell borrowing listing. First of 
all, this method is fast and convenient for the companies compared 
with standard IPO listing procedure for Chinese companies. This is 
because according to The Securities Law of The People's Republic 
of China, there are a list of strict requirements for IPO listing on 
market capital, ratio of public issued shares, number of sharehold-
ers and financial performance." On the other hand, if they want to 
be a listed company and choose a listed shell company, they can 
avoid all the above requirements and achieve their purpose for list-
ing quickly. As a result, shell listing provides a convenient back 
door for companies who want to be publicly listed but cannot fulfill 
the requirements for listing under the Securities Law. Also, if a 
company chooses to follow standard IPO procedure, the whole pro-
cess until public listing could take around 18 months. On the other 
hand, even though shell listing requires complicated financial re-
structuring between the parent and shell com,rany, it usually will 
take around 6 months to complete till listing.' 
Secondly, the cost to be listed is lower for a second offering of 
the shell company compared with IPO listing. In order to protect 
the interests of the investing public, the Securities Law set up 
higher thresholds on the cost of IPO listing. The to-be listed com-
pany has to provide a series of expenses from listing preparation to 
actual listing. On the other hand, the cost for a second offering on 
the restructured shell company is much lower than the IPO listing. 
This has become another important incentive for companies to 
choose shelllisting.57 
Thirdly, this method could also be used to avoid the problem 
of a difference in accounting methods between Chinese companies 
and overseas markets. As a result, this method has become a popu-
lar listing mechanism for Chinese comganies to be listed in Hong 
Kong and New York Stock Exchange.' 
S4. ZHAO Lei, "Research on Legal Risk Control of Back-door Usting", Journal of 
Anhui Vocational CoUege of Police Officers, General No. S4, Vol.10, No.3, 2011. 
SS. The Security Law of PRC. sections for !PO listing. 
S6. ZHAO LeL "Research on Legal Risk Control of Back-door Usting",Joumal of 
Anhui Vocational CoUege of Police Officers, General No. S4, Vol.10, No. 3, 2011. 
S1. Ibid. 
S8. ZHANG Yu, "Sample Analysis and Law Regulation to the Coming into Market 
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From the advantages mentioned above, shell listing seems to 
be a win-win solution for both shell and borrowing company. This is 
because the potential shell companies are usually public traded 
companies that are inactive, have low transparency and low future 
visibility, the injection of new assets and capital into the shell com-
pany provided them with an opportunity to get rid of problematic 
old assets and restructure its own financial structure.59 Also, there 
is also a potential bid rally on the shares of the shell company. This 
is also an opportunity for existing shareholders of the shell com-
pany to get rid of their non-performing old investment and profit in 
the market. On the other hand, as the cases mentioned above, this 
bid rally will also become a potential opportunity for insider trading 
to occur. This is also the reason that gives shell listing a bad name. 
According to the advantages mentioned above, there are a few 
successful cases under shell listing. The following are a few popular 
examples: 
- In February, 1990, the Hong Kong subsidiary of China Inter-
national Trust and Investment Corporation (Citic Group), 
Citic Hong Kong wanted to be listed in the Hong Kong stock 
market through shell listing, so they acquired 43 o/o equity of 
Taifu Development Co Ltd an existing listed company in 
Hong Kong and to be newly listed asCitic Pacific in January 
1991. After the purchase, the parent company Citic Group 
continued to inject capital into this company and made it 
become one of the 33 members in the Hong Kong Heng 
Sang Index. 
- In October, 1992, Chinese State Owned Enterprise, Shogang 
Group and Hong Kong company Cheung Kong (Hold-
ings)Limited in joint venture to acquire a Hong Kong listed 
company Tung Wing Steel Holdings Limited. Afterward, 
Cheung Kong (Holdings) Limited transferred most of its 
Tung Wing Steel Holdings Limited's shareboldings to Sho-
gang Group and the company was renamed to Shougang 
Concord International Enterprises Company Limited. This 
not only enabled Shogang Group to be listed in Hong Kong 
market, but the capital gain on Tung Wing Steel Holdings 
Limited from HKD$0.928 to HKD$2.77, bad enabled Sho-
gang Group to acquire this shell without using its own cash. 
Not only that, this shell borrowing listing enabled Shogang 
59. ZHAO Lei, "Re$earch on Legal Risk Control of Back-door Usliog". Journal of 
Anhui Voca1ional College of Police Officel"li. General No. 54. Voi.IO. No.3, 201 I. 
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Group to acquire HKD$1.8 billion in cash. The huge success 
for Shogang Group had become a success story for shell bor-
rowing listing and became a huge temptation for Chinese 
companies who wanted to be listed in Hong Kong.60 
On the other hand, besides the advantages and success stories 
mentioned above, there are also disadvantages of shell-borrowing 
listing. First of all, the cost of buying a shell may be unpredictable. 
Even though the expense on second offering is lower than IPO list-
ing, the cost of actually acquiring the shell of a listed company 
could be much higher than normal listing. For example, if the news 
of shell borrowing-being spread in the market, the share price of 
the shell could rally and increase the cost of shell purchases. Also, 
the risk of shell- borrowing listing could be much higher than nor-
mal listing. This is because Chinese companies usually not familiar 
with overseas market such as Hong Kong. Even though they have 
underwriters in the securities companies in helping them to choose 
target shell companies and undergoing comprehensive evaluations, 
there is still a risk that they purchase a problematic shell company. 
When they purchase a problematic company, they are not only una-
ble to be listed successfully, they even have to undertake the un-
wanted liabilities of the shell company. 
As a problem with shell-borrowing emerges gradually, China 
CSRC in February, 1994 introduced The paper in relation to exam 
and approval domestic enterprise issuing stock in overseas market. 
This indicated that when Chinese companies want to be listed over-
seas, it has to be approved by the State Council Securities Commis-
sion, or else shell-borrowing listed will not be allowed.61 As 
regulations for shell-borrowing listing become stricter and compa-
nies can be chosen as a shell become scarcer, Chinese companies 
are choosing a new revised method of shell listing: shell-making 
listing. 
b. Shell-making Listing 
Shell-making listing occurred when Chinese companies regis-
tered a newly formed company in the market planned to be listed 
or in a third region. The new company could either be solely owned 
60. ZHANG Yu, "Sample Analysis and Law Regulation to tbe Coming into Market 
of the Chinese Enterprises Through Shell-Borrowing Overseas" Journal of Hebei Uni-
versity of Eonnomics and Trade, Vol. 21, No.4, July 2000. 
61. ZHANG Yu, "Sample Analysis and Law Regulatioo to lhe Coming into Market 
ol the Olinese Enterprises Through Shell-Borrowing Overseas" Journal of Hebei Uni· 
versity of Economics and Trade, Vol. 21, No.4, July 2000. 
30 CoNTEMPORARY ASIAN STUDIES SERIES 
or jointly owned by the Chinese company as a holding company. 
For example, a Chinese company may form a solely or jointly 
owned holding company in a third region such as Bermuda, Cay-
man Island or British Virgin Island. In return, this holding will 
purchase the shares of the Chinese company as its holding company 
and this holding company can choose a desired market to be listed 
such as Hong Kong. During the process of shell making, choosing 
which place to be registered depends on the rules and regulation of 
the market they plan to be listed.62 
As shell-making has also become a popular method for Chi-
nese companies to raise capital from a public market. Shell-making 
has its advantages as well. The advantages are: 
- Shell-making listing has lower cost and lower risk compared 
with shell-borrowing. This is because the company does not 
need to take the risk of buying a problematic shell company. 
Also, the cost to register a new company in a third region 
should be much lower than purchasing the shares of a shell 
company. 
- Since China's own accounting, auditing and legal standards 
are generally different to international standards; registering 
the new company in a third overseas region ensures that it 
will be accepted by the market it planned to be listed.63 
On the other hand, there are also disadvantages to shell-mak-
ing listing. First of all, the Chinese company needs to use a signifi-
cant amount of capital to remit to overseas to establish the new 
company. This may be a huge financial burden for the company. 
Second, is time consumption, as it may take a few years from com-
pany register to public listing in the overseas market. This is be-
cause the regulatory authority of the listing market usually requires 
companies registered in places such as Cayman Island or BVI to be 
operated for a few years before they qualify for public listing. This 
is used to avoid a paper company becoming a public listed 
company.64 
G. Problems Arise from Shell Listing 
As illustrated from by the above analysis, Chinese companies 
need mechanisms such as shell listing as a convenient means for 
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the standard for shell listing is much lower than formal IPO listing. 
As it is much easier for the company to acquire a shell company, 
inject capital and restructure the company and IPO the shell com-
pany than to follow all the formal IPO listing standards by 
themselves. 
On the other hand, the widely used shell listing such as cases 
mentioned above does lead to some problems. The problems are as 
follows: 
- Legal and regulatory problem: Chinese companies are often 
unfamiliar with overseas legal systems, regulations and lack 
experience in dealing with overseas legal regulators. This 
could create huge losses or even lead to complete failure 
during the shell-borrowing or making process. 
- Higher than market cost: During the process of shell listing, 
Chinese companies may spend too much capital on purchas-
ing or making the shell that may lead to a shortage of its own 
operating capital and create a problem with its own opera-
tion. This may occur when a Chinese company may use a 
huge amount of money to bid for a shell company. For ex-
ample, the potential shell companies in Hong Kong are usu-
ally public traded companies that are inactive, bas low 
transparency and low future visibility company with very low 
share price. With shell listing becoming a popular listing 
method for Chinese companies to list in Hong Kong, the po-
tential shell companies in Hong Kong are becoming popular 
targets for Chinese companies. There may be a few Chinese 
companies who have become active bidders for those poten-
tial shell companies and its shares rally to be much higher 
than its fair value. As a result, when the Chinese company 
finally gets the shell company, the bidding process may make 
it pay a few more times on the share prices than its fair mar-
ket value. 
- Dual accounting book: When a Chinese company finally cre-
ates the listed shell companies, the shell company usually bas 
two sets of accounting books. As for a shell listed company 
in Hong Kong, an outer accounting book is kept to fuJfill the 
accounting and auditing requirement of Hong Kong regula-
tors. An inner accounting book is the actual accounting book 
that records the actual financial and operating activities of 
the company. The existence of two accounting books might 
create the opportunity of a loophole for operating and man-
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agement officers to transfer capital and assets for their own 
interest or room for accounting fraud and corruption. 
- Legal control on assets: There is lack of comprehensive legal 
regulations to monitor the assets of Chinese companies in 
the listed shell company. This is because some of the Chi-
nese companies listed in Hong Kong are state owned enter-
prises. When they are listed in Hong Kong through shell 
listing, Chinese stated owned assets sometimes are being 
transferred to private hands without any legal regulation to 
monitor.65 
- Window of opportunity for insider trading to occur: As the 
shares of potential shell companies may rally as Chinese 
companies actively bid for their control, this is becoming an 
opportunity for insider trading to occur. As mentioned 
above, the shares of potential shell companies are mostly in-
actively traded and low valuation, the bid rally makes this 
type of companies to be attractive targets for insider trading. 
The insiders are usually major stakeholders of the deal such 
as securities underwriters and major shareholders of the po-
tential shell companies or bidding companies are usually the 
insider to acquire firsthand information of the potential bid. 
They can easily make a handsome profit in the market by 
trading during the bid rally. This is being illustrated during 
the case of Huang and Shiao. Once the stakeholders on the 
deal acknowledge on the bid, they can easily leak the infor-
mation to their friends and relatives to profit from the deal. 
H. Remedies and Regulations Cor Shell Listing: 
1. Remedies 
Despite all the problems illustrated above for shell listing, shell 
listing indeed is an effective and convenient resolution for Chinese 
companies to list in the public market, especially in overseas capital 
markets. In order to utilize the advantages of shell listing and avoid 
its related problems, there are a few points which need to be fo-
cused on in order to provide a remedy for the problem on shell 
listing. 
- careful selection of potential shell company: When a com-
pany decides to choose shell listing as their method of listing, 
65. ZHAO Lei, "Research on Legal Risk Control of Back-door Listing", Journal of 
Anhui Vocational College of Police Officers, General No. 54, Vol.lO. No.3. 2011. 
INSIDE:R TRADING IN CHINA 33 
they should choose the appropriate potential shell company 
carefully. They should choose a shell company which will not 
only provide them with a shell. but also provide them with 
the operational and financial resources they needed. They 
sbould choose a shell that could maximize their benefits on 
their capital structure for public listing. 
- Limiting on related parties trades: According to The Usting 
Rules of Shanghai and Sheozhen Stock Exchange, related 
parties transaction means the transactions that related legal 
persons, related natural persons and potential related parties 
bad transfer resources in order to directly or indirectly gain 
control over a public company or its holding subsidiaries. 
During the shell listing process, the unlisted company gains 
equity and control of a public listing shell company either 
t.hrough equity exchange, resources exchange should be con-
sidered a related parties transaction. Hence, it should be reg-
ulated and governed by regulations in the stock exchange on 
related party transaction. If regulated effectively, it could be 
used to avoid unlawful profit to occur as the unlisted com-
pany gaining control of the public company and using their 
position of control to exchange their low quality asset with 
more valuable asset of the public shell company in order to 
strip the asset of the shell company.66 
- Protect the interests of smallfmdividual shareholders/inves-
tors: Due to un-equivalent of information, small investors 
usually become the victims of the controlling/major share-
holder's profit taking. On the other hand, it is important that 
the interests of small/individual investors' interest should be 
addressed and protected. This is because: 
1. D ue to the defects of the financial market. this often leads 
to unfair informat.ion and major shareholders controlling 
the board of directors. As a result. the small investors 
have no voice or control in the capital market. Their in-
terests are often being overlooked. 
2. Small and individual investors are an important part of 
capital resources for the company's survival. A public 
company can not only survive on major shareholder and 
without help from small investors. 
66. Ibid. 
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3. To protect the interests of small investors is important to 
the prosperity and stability of a financial market.67 
- Establish a complete and competent relevant information 
disclosure system: A complete and competent information 
disclosure system is the fundamental requirement to protect 
the small individuaVinvestor's rights to relevant financial in· 
formation. The Section 86 of the current Security Law of 
PRC, with the 5% threshold for relevant information disclo-
sure. Unfortunately, with the current capital market condi-
tions and increase in liquidity of the stock market, the 5% 
threshold may not be enough. As a result, China can take 
the example of U.S. with the disclosure of 5% and +1-1% 
will be required for disclosure.68 
2. Regulations 
In another words, regulations targeted on shell listing mecha-
nism are indeed needed in order to avoid problems related to shell 
listing to emerge. As a result, starting on September 1, 2011, CSRC 
declared the formal implementation of the Decision on Revising the 
Relevant Provisions on Major Asset Reorganization and Supporting 
Financing for Listed Companies or "the decision". According to the 
decision, it not only clearly specified the scope and method of su· 
pervision for shell listing; it also introduced additional requirements 
on Administrative Measures for Material Assets Reorganization of 
Listed Companies. This is used to introduce specific requirements 
for operation management, operation timing and profit manage-
ment on shell companies. For example, the decision has raised the 
threshold for asset restructuring on shell listing. The decision speci· 
fied the company should operate and manage the shell company 
continuously for more than 3 years and the shell company should 
operate at a profit of more than RMB$20million for more than two 
consecutive accounting years. According to the requirement of 
2006. Opinions on the Application of Securities and Futures Lows 
for normal IPO, the listing company should operate at a profit of 
more than RMB$30million for more than three consecutive ac-
counting years. In other words, after the implementation of the de-
67. CHOW Olin Yen "The Prol«tioo for SllllllVMedium lnveslors under SbeU 
Llstmg Process- Otiua Academoc Journal Etec:troruc Publosluns House. http://www. 
enkl.nct. 2011. Mardi. 
68. lbul. 
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ctSton, the standard for shell listing is becoming close to the 
standard of normal IPO listing. 69 
In order to avoid the occurrence of related parties transaction 
and insider trading related to shell listing, CSRC decided to issue a 
series of decisions such as the Release of Suggestions on Strengthen-
ing the Supervision of Listed Companies, the Notification on the 
Regulation on Major Purchase or Selling of Large Assets buy Listed 
Companies, the Administrative Measures for the Takeover of Listed 
Companies, Measures for the Administration of Disclosure of Share-
holder Equity Changes of Listed Companies, Administrative Mea-
sures for Material Assets Reorganization of Listed Ccmpanies, 
Regularizing the Information Disclosure of Listed Companies and 
Behaviors of Relevant Parties.70 This series of regulations and deci-
sions are used to focus on the related parties and insider trading 
problems on shell listing that are detrimental to the market compe-
tence and investor confidence in the stock market. 
This is the first time China's regulators introduced regulations 
that focused on regulating shell listing. Before "the decisions" were 
introduced, the listing standards for shell listing were much lower 
than standard IPO. As a result, when a company purchased a shell 
company, they can inject capital and restructure the financial struc-
ture of the shell company in a short period of time. As the process 
of restructuring and chain of decision is often complicated, it is easy 
to hide illegal activities such as insider trading and related parties-
dealing during the process." 
On the other hand, as the introduction of "the decision" made 
the requirement for shell listing stricter and increased the trans-
parency for shell listing, it is also likely to reduce shell listing in the 
future and encourage Chinese companies to follow the formal stan-
dards of IPO listing. Even though insider trading often related to 
shell bidding and listing, but there are indeed some advantages re-
lated to shell listing and it is unlikely that the shell listing mecha-
nism will disappear in the financial market. As a result, the 
69. LU Bing "Shell Listing Required Stricter and More Comprehensive Regula-
tions'' CapiJal and Law, Olin a Academic Journal Electronic Pubtishing House, http:// 
www.cnki.net, 2011, September. 
70. ZHAO Lei, "Research on Legal Risk Control of Back-door Listing", Journal of 
Anhui Vocational College of Pntioe Offioers, General No. S4. Vol.lO, No. 3, 2011. 
11. LU Bing "Shell Usting Required Stricter and More Comprehensive Regula-
tions" Capital and Law, China Acadentic Journal Electronic Pubtishing House, http:// 
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regulator should provide effective regulations for this mechanism 
rather than limiting it to occur. 
VII. INSIDER TRADING IN THE U.S.A 
In the United States and several other jurisdictions, trading 
conducted by corporate officers, key employees, directors, or signif· 
icant shareholders (in the U.S., defined as beneficial owners of ten 
percent or more of the firm's equity securities) must be reported to 
the regulator or publicly disclosed, usually within a few business 
days of the trade. Many investors follow the summaries of these 
insider trades in the hope that mimicking these trades will be profit-
able. While "legal" insider trading cannot be based on material 
non·public information, some investors believe corporate insiders 
may have better insight into the health of the company or its finan-
cial performance. As a result, their trades may convey important 
information. On the other hand, the existence of legal insider trad-
ing has always been considered to be a grey area as it is only one 
line to consider being legal or illegal concerning insider trading. 
A. Dlegal 
What attracted the concern of legal authorities or the financial 
market is the existence of illegal insider trading. R ules against in-
sider trading on material non-public information exist in most juris· 
dictions around the world, though the details and the efforts to 
enforce them vary considerably. In the United States, insider trad-
ing is regulated by Sections 16(b) and lO(b) of the Securities Ex-
change Act of 1934 which directly and indirectly addresses the 
issue. Congress enacted this act after the stock market crash of 
1929.72 The United States is generally viewed as the one of the first 
and having the strictest laws against illegal insider trading, and 
makes the most serious efforts to enforce them. 
1. Definilion of "insider" 
In the United States and Germany, for mandatory reporting 
purposes, company insiders are defined as a company's officers, di-
rectors and any beneficial owners of more than ten percent of a 
class of the company's equity securities. Trades made by these types 
of insiders in the company's own stock, based on material non-pub-
lic information, are considered to be fraudulent since the insiders 
72. Speech by SEC Staff: Insider Trading • A U.S. Perspt!ctive"' by Thomas C. 
Newkirk. Associate Director, Division of Enforcement (September 1998) 
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are violating the fiduciary duty that they owe to the shareholders. 
The corporate insider, simply by accepting employment, bas under-
taken a legal obligation to the shareholders to put the shareholders' 
interests before their own, in mailers related to the corporation. 
When the insider buys or sells based upon company owned infor-
mation, he or she is violating hislher obligation to the sharehold-
ers.73 For example, illegal insider trading would occur if the chief 
executive officer of Company A learned (prior to a public an-
nouncement) that Company A will be taken over, a.nd bought 
shares in Company A knowing that the share price would likely 
rise. 
In the United States and many other jurisdictions, however, 
"insiders" are not just limited to corporate officials and major 
shareholders where illegal insider trading is concerned, but can in-
clude any individual who trades shares based on material non-pub-
lic information in violation of some duty of trust. This duty may be 
imputed; for example, in many jurisdictions, in cases of where a 
company insider "tips" a friend about non-public information likely 
to have an effect on the company's share price, the duty the com-
pany insider owes the company is now imputed to the friend and 
the friend violates a duty to tbe company if he or she trades on the 
basis of this information. For example in the case of Rajaratnam 
and Gupta, Gupta as director of Goldman Sachs was found to be 
guilty of insider trades as he tips his friend Rajaratnam of Goldman 
Sachs's earnings result before this information is released to the 
public. 
2. Misappropriation theory 
A newer view of insider trading, the "misappropriation the-
ory," is now part of U.S. law. It states that anyone who misappro-
priates (stea.ls) information from their employer and trades on that 
information in ANY stock (either the employer's stock or the com-
pany's competitor stocks) is guilty of insider trading_?• For example, 
if a fund manager who worked for Company B learned about the 
takeover of Company A while performing his work duties, and 
bought stock in Company A personally, illegal insider trading might 
still have occurred. Even though the fund manager did not violate a 
fiduciary duty to Company A's shareholders, he might have vio-
73. Wikipedia on Insider Tr.chna: bllp~lea.wil:ipedia.ors/"'•killnsidcr_tt11din& 
74 Larry Harris, Tr.chna 4 Eu:Jun&cs, Orlonl Press, Oxford, 2003. Olapler 29 
"IMKkr Tradiog" p. 586-587 
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lated a fiduciary duty to Company B's shareholders (assuming the 
investment fund bad a policy of not allowing fund manager to trade 
for themselves). 
3. Proof of responsibility 
Proving that someone has been responsible for a trade can be 
difficult, because traders may try to bide behind nominees, offshore 
companies, and other proxies. Nevertheless, the U.S. Securities and 
Exchange Commission (SEC) prosecute over 50 cases each year, 
with many being settled administratively out of court.7.1 The SEC 
and several stock exchanges actively monitor trading, looking for 
suspicious activity. 
B. The Insider Trading Law of the U.S.A. 
As United States has been the leading country in prohibiting 
insider trading made on the basis of material non-public informa-
tion. Thomas Newkirk and Melissa Robertson of the U.S. Securities 
and Exchange Commission summarize the development of U.S. in· 
sider trading Jaws. Insider trading bas a base offense level of 8, 
which puts it in Zone A under the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines. This 
means that first-time offenders are eligible to receive probation 
rather than incarceration.76 
1. Common Law 
U.S. insider trading prohibitions are based on English and 
American common law prohibitions against fraud. In 1909, well 
before the Securities Exchange Act was passed, the United States 
Supreme Court ruled that a corporate director who bought that 
company's stock when he knew it was about to jump up in price 
committed fraud by buying while not disclosing his inside 
information. 
Section 15 of the Securities Act of 1933 contained prohibitions 
of fraud in the sale of securities which were greatly strengthened by 
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934. Section 16(b) of the Securities 
Exchange Act of 1934 prohibits short-swing profits (from any 
purchases and sales within any six month period) made by corpo-
rate directors, officers, or stockholders owning more than 10% of a 
firm's shares. Under Section lO(b) of the 1934 Act, SEC Rule lOb-
S, prohibits fraud related to securities trading. 
15. Wikipedia on IIISlder Trad•ng; http~/en.wikipedla.org/Wtkillnsider_trading 
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The Insider Trading Sanctions Act of 1984 and the Insider 
Trading and Securities Fraud Enforcement Act of 1988 provide for 
penalties for illegal insider trading to be as high as three times the 
profit gained or the loss avoided from the illegal trading. 
SEC regulation FD ("Fair Disclosure") requires that if a com-
pany intentionally discloses material non-public information to one 
person, it must simultaneously disclose that information to the pub-
lic at large. In the case of an unintentional disclosure of material 
non-public information to one person, the company must make a 
public disclosure "promptly. "77lnsider trading, or similar practices, 
are also regulated by the SEC under its rules on takeovers and 
tender offers under the Williams Act.78 
The most recent development in regulating the insider trading 
is the Dodd-Frank Act. This act was passed on July 31 2011 focusing 
on financial regulations and insider trading activities in the post-
global financial crisis world. The Act changes the existing regula-
tory structure, such as creating a host of new agencies in an effort to 
streamline the regulatory process, increasing oversight of specific 
institutions regarded as a systemic risk, amending the Federal Re-
serve Act and promoting transparency. The Act purports to provide 
rigorous standards and supervision to protect the economy and 
American consumers, investors and businesses and to end taxpayer 
funded bailouts of financial institutions, claim to provide for an ad-
vanced warning system on the stability of the economy, creates 
rules on executive compensation and corporate governance, and 
eliminates some loopholes that led to the 2008 economic recession. 
Under this Act, important new agencies created include Financial 
Stability Oversight Council, the Office of Financial Research and 
the Bureau of Consumer Financial Protection. Of the existing agen-
cies, changes are proposed ranging from new powers to the transfer 
of powers in an effort to enhance the regulatory system. On the 
other hand, even though the Act was being passed, but the imple-
mentation details of this Act was still in discuss with various finan-
cial participants such as SEC, Chicago Mercantile Exchange (CME) 
and Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC).79 
77. Larry Harris, Trading & Exchanges, Oxford Press, Oxford, 2003. Chapter 29 
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40 CoNTEMPORARY AsiAN STUDIES SERIES 
Vru. THE lNSIDER TRADING CASES OF RAJARATNAM, 
GOFFER AND GUYfA 
Besides, laws and regulations, much of the developments of in· 
sider trading law bas resulted from court decisions. U.S. securities 
regulators initiated a crackdown on insider trading activities since 
2007. As a result, the most significant developments are the cases 
on Rajaratnam, Goffer and Gupta. These three cases are compli· 
cated and inter-related, but their convictions are considered one of 
the most important victories of financial regulator against insider 
trading. 
A. Fllds 
On October 16, 2009, United States Securities and Exchange 
Commission (SEC) sued Raj Rajaratnam for engaging in insider 
trading. Also, Rajaratnam, the billionaire founder of Galleon 
Group was among six people who were arrested and charged in a 
US$20 million insider trading scheme under federa l prosecution. 
Besides Rajaratnam, prosecutors also arrested Rajiv Goel, director 
in Intel Capital strategic investments, Anil Kumar, director at McK-
insey & Co., mM Corp executive Robert Moffat, DanieUe Cbiesi 
and Mark Kurland, fund manager at New Castle Partners.80 Federal 
investigation had this case for more than two years in the making 
and among the biggest undercover operations in insider trading. By 
November 6, 2009, US prosecutors charged another fourteen peo-
ple, including hedge fund managers, lawyers and ex-Galleon Group 
employees with method dealing with drug dealers and common 
criminals as they profited on insider data from deals involving firms 
such as 3Com Corp and Alliance Data System Corp. These addi-
tional charges had brought the combine illegal profits in these cases 
from US$20 million to as much as US$53 million." 
The investigation did not stop by the unraveling of these two 
insider trading rings. By March 2010, the prosecutors were exBnlin-
ing the trades in Goldman Sachs shares by Rajaratnam. The former 
Goldman Sachs board member, Raj at Kumar Gupta was also being 
examined and later arrested as he was a onetime business partner 
with Rajaratnam. Gupta was a board member of Goldman Sachs 
since November 2006 and only ceased to be on the board three days 
1<0. David Glovio. Kathenne Bunon & David Sebeer "Golloen's Rajaratnam 
Charged tn Bigges1 Hedge Sehcme" Bloomberg, L.P: Oel. 16. 2009. 
81 . Oa>id Glovin. Bob Van Vons & Joshua GaUu "Hedge Fund Managers. Traders 
Chorged tn Galleon Tradtng Probe" Bloomberg, LP, No, ember 6. 2009. 
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before the prosecutor announced their investigation."' On Oct. 26, 
2011 Gupta was charged with 5 counts of securities fraud and one 
count of conspiracy to commit securities fraud.113 The SEC filed its 
lawsuit the same day, accusing Gupta of engaging in an extensive 
insider trading scheme with Rajaratnam.84 On June 15,2012, Gupta 
was found guilty of securities fraud and conspiracy. Securities fraud 
carries a maximum prison sentence of 20 years and conspiracy car-
ries a five year maximum . .._. 
Rajaratnam faces 13 fraud and conspiracy counts and many 
carry 20-year maximum sentences. On October 13,2011 be was sen-
tenced to 11 years in prison for insider trading ... He was also or-
dered by the federal judge to pay US$92.8 million for the case 
brought by the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC).81 
The six defendants were charged with using insider trading informa-
tion in the above two overlapping schemes to trade shares of com-
panies including Google Inc., Polycom Inc., Hilton I lotels Corp and 
Advanced Micro Devices Inc (AMD). They were arrested under 
the insider trading scheme as trading tips to Rajaratnam since 2006 
came from insiders and others at hedge funds, investor relations 
fm:ns, and companies including Intel, ffiM, McKinsey, and compa-
nies whose shares were traded in the scheme. Under this scheme. 
Rajaratnam and his firm had earned around $23 million from the 
fraud.88 
8 . Rajaratnam: October 16, 2009 
This is a case of hedge fund insider trading as Rajaratnam 
founded Galleon in January 1997 and focusing on technology and 
health-care stocks. Galleon had grown to US$5 billion in 2001 and 
82. Jolm Helyar. Mehul Sm101a, .. & David Gkwin "Goldman s.dlo Director 
Gupto DealJ .,.;th Rajaratnam" Bloomber&o l..P, April 22, 2010. 
83. U.S. v. Gupta. 11-a-00907. U.S. Oi3trict Court lor Soutbem 0.111<1 ol New 
York (Manhattan). 
84. SEC v. Gupta, tt-cv.()7566, U.S. District Court lor tbc Southern District ol New 
York (Maobattao) 
8S. U.S. v. Gupta, ll·cr-00907, U.S. District Court for Southern District of New 
York (Maohattao). 
86. U.S. v. Rajaratnam, ~. U.S. District Court, Southern DISirict or New 
York (Moobattan). 
87. SEC v. Rajaratnam, 09-cv-8811. U.S. District Court. Soulh<m Dutrict of New 
York (MoohattaD). 
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US$8 billion when Rajaratnam was arrested.89 This rapid growth in 
fund size was the result of Rajaratnam engaging in insider trading 
schemes. As indicated by the SEC, Rajaratnam had cultivated a 
network of high-ranking corporate executives and insiders and 
tapped into this ring to obtain confidential details about quarterly 
earnings and takeover activities.90 
Prosecutors started to investigate this case in 2007 and a person 
working in Galleon had pleaded guilty and cooperated with the 
prosecutor by indicating that Rajaratnam used insider information 
tips to trade since 2006. Prosecutors bad used telephone recordings 
and cell phone interception to provide evidence indicated that 
Rajaratnam instructed colleagues to create e-mails designed to hide 
his source of information and make trades to mask his illegal 
activities.91 
Evidence indicated that Rajaratnam had traded in 2006 and 
2007 on leaks from insiders at Polycom, Moody's investors Services 
Inc and Market Street Partners. For example, a Moody's analysts 
offered news about Hilton and a Market Street Partners source pro-
vided tips about Google. Rajaratnam earned US$12.7 million on 
the leaks and gave a confidential government informant inside in-
formation on other companies in return. 92 
/ . Intel 
One of the six people arrested, Rajiv Goel, director in Intel 
Capital strategic investments, had passed news about Intel's invest-
ment in Clearwire Corp and enabled Rajaratnam to make a profit 
of about US$579,000. ln return, Rajaratnam placed profitable 
trades for the benefit of Goel in a personal brokerage account in 
Charles Schawb.9J 
2. Trading Ring Scheme: 
Another tipping ring involved three other defendants, Robert 
Moffat, Danielle Cbiesi and Mark Kurland. Chiesi a Bear Stearns 
veteran got secret tips from her source in Akamai Technologies Inc. 
and from Robert Moffat who passed along information about IDM, 
89. Katherine Burton & Saijel Kishan "Raj Rajaratnam Became Billionaire De· 
manding Edge" Bloomberg. l.P, Oct. 19. 2009. 
90. David Glovin. Kathenne Burton & David Scheer "Galloen's Rajaratnam 
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Sun Microsystems and AMD and AMD's venture in Abu Dhabi in 
which ffiM participated. Chiesi then passed along these tips to Kur-
land and both traded on the news. Also, Chiesi passed these tips to 
Rajaratnam, who in turn gave Chiesi inside information AMD and 
other companies. According to a phone conversation between 
Chiesi and Rajaratnam on July 24, 2008, Chiesi told Rajaratnam 
that her source told her that Akamai's share price would go down 
to US$25. That day, Akamai share price closed at US$32.18. As a 
result, Chiesi told Rajaratnam to short Akamai's shares everyday 
and hence Rajaratnam profited.94 
3. The Case of McKinsey 
Anil Kumar was the director at McKinsey & Co., and he gave 
Rajaratnam tips about McKinsey's client. Kumar was not only a di-
rector in McKinsey, but also an investor in Galleon. He became a 
consultant for AMD as McKinsey's client. AMD was considering 
spinning off its semiconductor operation into a joint venture with 
the Abu Dhabi government. That would bring a major investment 
from an Abu Dhabi wealth fund and likely increase in AMD stock 
price. When both parties shook hands and sealed the deal, Kumar 
called Rajaratnam on August 15, 2009 to tell him to buy the stock. 
On that day and the following Monday, Galleon bought 5.9 million 
shares of AMD at between the price of US$5.55-5.75.93 
In turn, Rajaratnam relayed the information to Chiesi of New 
Castle, which bad purchased 199,440 AMD shares at US$5.44. As 
Chiesi worried about being caught, Rajaratnam suggested covering 
her tracks by trading in and out of the stock while they wait for the 
deal's completion. On the other hand, Galleon continued to add 
AMD shares to its position and eventually reached 8 million shares 
of AMD stocks. As the deal's announcement date was October 7, 
Rajaratnam told Chiesi to sell half before the announcement. On 
October 7, AMD shares rose 25% and increased the value of Gal-
leon's shares by US$9.5 million. He sold 1.3 million shares on the 
announcement day and held the rest and watched AMD shares de-
ctine to US$3.5 by the end of the month under a f,;eneral decline of 
the stock market amid the global financial crisis. 
94. U.S. v. Oliesi, 09-mag-2307, U.S. District C<>urt, Southern Disb:ict of New York 
(Manhattan). 
95. John Helyar "Galleon Insider-Trading Case Opens Window on Secret Hedge 
Funds" Bloomberg, L.P, Oct. 19, 2009. 
96. Ibid. 
44 CONTEMPORARY ASIAN STUDIES SERIES 
4. Google 
From a source of Market Street Partners, an investor relations 
contractor for Google indicated that in July, 2007 that Google's sec-
ond quarter earnings would be disappointing compared to market 
expectations later in the month. The information was relayed to 
Rajaratnam, who with a combination of buying Google put options 
and short-selling on the stock, made a US$8 million profit.97 
5. The Investigation 
Basically, this case is considered one of the most significant in-
sider trading cases in the global financial world. The U.S. govern-
ment's charging of Rajaratnam and five other defendants was due 
to the help of wiretaps as it provided rich insider details of usually 
secret hedge fund operations carried out by Rajaratnam and his re-
lated parties. The wire transcripts made it appear that trafficking in 
inside information was a routine way of business for Rajaratnam. 
The starting point was a 2005 job interview at Galleon which 
Rajaratnam asked applicants to name companies where he has an 
"edge" or access to inside information. The applicants had later be-
come confidential witnesses for this case. Even though this inform-
ant was not hired by Galleon, the witness began feeding 
Rajaratnam inside information. The information enabled Galleon 
to turn a US$4 million profit on a tip about Blackstone Group's 
US$20 billion buyout of Hilton the day before the announcement. 
The informant in turn receives inside information from Rajaratnam 
on Intel and other companies. This informant later pled guilty and 
cooperated by taping conversations \vith Rajaratnam and 
Rajaratnam's private talks with his friends.96 
One frequent caller was Danielle Chiesi, fund manager in New 
Castle Partners and Bear Stearns veteran. A call in 2008 indicated, 
Chiesi's colleague Mark Kurland had encouraged her to get more 
inside intelligence from the relationships and not to worry about 
the consequences. As a result, Chiesi had cultivated an executive in 
Microchip to provide inside information and at Akamai Technolo-
gies, she had a family friend who leaked data to her. She used 
Akamai intelligence for New Castle's trading and passed it to 
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Rajaratnam made a handsome profit by shorting the Akamai 
shares. 
Danielle Chiesi is an important part of Rajaratnam's insider 
trading ring. According to the investigation, she is involved in the 
insider trading scheme on AMD and Akamai, she received a lot of 
insider information from hotel ballrooms and bars during the past 
decade. As an analyst at New Castle Fund LLC, a New York hedge 
fund that manages about US$1 billion. She was a regular at confer-
ences on technology companies and had face time with executives 
for information on their companies. She would wear short skirts 
and low-cut tops and barhopped to get information from people on 
the dance floor. A blond former teenage beauty queen, she used 
her sexuality to build sources at the male dominated tech compa-
nies and she was very proud of her network. As a result, Chiesi got 
tips from executives at technology companies and passed them to 
hedge fund managers such as Rajaratnam. Her boss Mark Kurland 
in New Castle, who was also being arrested, had encouraged her 
source building. The reality is Chiesi's source building paid off. New 
Castle made US$3.8 million in six months, starting in July 2008 by 
using information gathered by her. 100 Please bear in mind that 2008 
was the year of the global financial crisis and the equity market 
suffered during this period of time, so her source building did make 
her trade ahead of market during difficult market times. 
C. Goffer - November 6, 2009 
On November 6, 2009, there were additional charges on four-
teen people for charges against the defendants include conspiracy 
and fraud. This time it focused on the center of a new insider trad-
ing ring headed by Zvi Goffer, a former Galleon employee who 
sought tips and Arthur Cutillo, an attorney at Ropes & Gray LLP 
and the ring's key source of information. As Goffer later founded 
his own company, Incremental Capital LLC, paid tipsters including 
Cutillo for information on merger and acquisitions and giving them 
pre-paid mobile phones so they would avoid surveillance. This new 
insider ring included Craig Drimal, Galleon employee; Jason 
Goldfard, New York-based attorney; Goffer's brother Emauel Gof-
fer; Atheros Communications Vice President Ali Hariri, and Iocre-
mental Capital employee David Plate; and Michael Kimelman. 
Another person who pled guilty and cooperated with prosecutors 
100. Anthony Effinger, Katherine Burton & Ian IGng "Woman Who Sank Galleon 
Was Beauty-Queen-Turned-Analyst Insider" Bloomberg, I...P, November 22, 2009. 
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was Steven Fortuna, managing director at hedge fund S2 Capital. 
SEC also sued Schottenfeld Group, a New York-based broker 
dealer where several defendants worked.101 
Within the ring, Goffer was known as "the Octopussy'', a refer-
ence to the 1983 James Bond film and indicates his reputation for 
having multiple sources of insider information. For example, Goffer 
gave one of his sources a disposable mobile phone before Bain 
Capital LLC's proposed buyout of 3Com. The phone had two 
programmed numbers labeled "you" and "me". After the deal was 
announced, Goffer removed the phone's SIM card, bit it, and broke 
the phone in half. I02 
As part of this ring, Arthur Cutillo passed news about deals 
Ropes & Gray was working on to Jason Goldfard, another New 
York lawyer, who passed the information to Goffer. Even though 
Cutillo no longer worked at the firm, he got kickbacks for his tips 
on four deals including the purchase of Hilton Hotels Corp. Goffer 
passed along the tips he got from Cuttillo to Kimelman, Shankar, 
Plate, Drimal and his brother Emmanuel. Drimal and Shankar 
leaked the information to others. I03 
Wiretaps provided much of the evidence siniilar to the in the 
Rajaratnam ring. As the investigator tapped Drimal's mobile 
phone, Goffer's phone calls were intercepted at Galleon as soon as 
he joined the company in January, 2008.1(1.0 
When Rajaratnam's Galleon and Chiesi's New Castle shorted 
the Akamai in 2008 Fortuna's S2 Capital got the tips from them and 
shorted along with them. From this trade, Galleon made US$3.5 
million, New Castle made US$2.4 million and S2 made US$2.4 mil-
lion. After the investigation, Fortuna pled guilty to security fraud 
and is cooperated with the prosecutors.105 
D. Gupta · March 2011 
The prosecutor made public on their investigation on Rajat 
Kumar Gupta on April 9, 2011. Rajat Kumar Gupta was not only a 
board member of Goldman Sachs, but also served on Goldman 
101. David Olovin, Bob Van Voris & Joshua Oallu "Hedge Fund Managers. Traders 
Olarged in Galleon Trading Probe"' Bloomberg. L.P. November 6. 2009. 
102. U.S. v. Golfer 
103. Ibid. 
104. David Glovin, Bob Van Voris & Joshua Gallu ""Hedge Fund Managers. Traders 
Olarged in Galleon Trading Probe"" Bloomberg. L.P. November 6. 2009. 
lOS. Anthony Effinger. Katherine Burton & lao King "Woman Who Sank Galleon 
Was Beauty·Oueen·Turned·Ana1yst Insider·· Bloomberg, L.P. November 22. 2009. 
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board's audit, compensation and corporate-governance committee. 
He was the strategic and operational expert on its board. Before 
joining Goldman, he was the worldwide managing director of McK-
insey & Co and special adviser to Secretary General of United Na-
tion. He also worked in AMR Group, Procter & Gamble, Harman 
International Industries, Genpact Ltd and Russia's OAO Sberbank 
after his days in McKinsey. He formed partnerships with 
Rajaratnam to form Taj Capital Partners in 2006 and the fund 
aimed to put US$2 billion into South Asian investments and half of 
its investments through a hedge fund run by Rajaratnam. Even 
though this involvement was short lived as Rajaratnam withdrew 
from the deal, but this made the prosecutors investigating 
Rajaratnam's interest on trading in Goldman stock in 2008, espe-
cially on the trade made before the September 2008 disclosure that 
Berkshire Hathaway's Warren Buffett paid US$5 billion to acquire 
Goldman's preferred stock paying 10% interest.106 
Besides Rajaratnam, Gupta had a relationship with another 
defendant in this case, Ani! Kumar. They were friends and associ-
ates from his days in McKinsey and Kumar had pleaded guilty on 
January 8, 2010 for leaking insider information to Rajaratnam over 
5 years and in exchange for US$1.75 million. During Gupta's days 
in McKinsey, Kumar was the head of operations to outsource high-
level research to India.107 
On the other hand, the insider trading prosecution of Gupta 
was built on circumstantial evidence that may be less persuasive 
than the wiretap evidence on Rajaratnam. As the prosecutor lacked 
direct wiretaps on Gupta, they sought to convict Gupta based on 
the timing of his phone caUs with Rajaratnam and Rajaratnam's 
trades that immediately foUowed. Prosecutors unsealed a six-count 
indictment accusing him of leaking inside information to 
Rajaratnam. It began in March 2007 that Gupta tipped Rajaratnam 
about Goldman Sachs's first quarter 2007 earnings as he and Gupta 
participated in the Goldman Sachs board meeting as audit commit-
tee from Galleon's office. During the meeting, the audit committee 
discussed the company's quarterly earnings as it would be an-
nounced to the market the foUowing day. This conference call had 
made the prosecutor to add a new securities fraud charge where 
tbere was discussion on the quarterly earnings release of Goldman 
106. John Helyar, Mebul Srivastava & David Glovin "Goldman Sa<:bs Director 
Gupta Dealt with Rajaratnam" Bloomberg, L.P, April Z2., 2010. 
107. Ibid. 
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Sachs that it would exceed analyst estimates. About 25 minutes af-
ter Gupta left the conference call; Rajaratnam's fund purchased 
about 350,000 Goldman shares. Gupta continued to tip Rajaratnam 
on its September 19, 2JXfl board meeting as its quarterly earnings 
were announced. 108 
Gupta was also accused of telling Rajaratnam about Berkshire 
Hathaway's US$5 billion investment in Goldman Sachs in Septem-
ber 2008, Goldman's unexpected fourth quarter loss in 2008 and 
P&G's poor performance in late 2008. To show Gupta tipped 
Rajaratnam about Berkshire's investment, evidence shows Gupta 
called Rajaratnam approximately 16 seconds after learning about it 
during Goldman Sachs board meeting on September 23, 2008 and 
Rajaratnam bought the shares minutes later. To establish that 
Gupta leaked news about Goldman's 2008 loss, he called 
Rajaratnam 23 seconds after leaving a board conference call on Oc-
tober 23, 2008 and Rajaratnam sold 150,000 Goldman shares the 
next morning."» To prove that Gupta disclosed P&G's poor earn-
ings performance, the indictment cites an eight minute telephone 
call that Gupta made to Rajaratnam from Switzerland on January 
29, 2009, hours after be learned about P&G's financial results. 
Rajaratnam also claimed to have gotten information from someone 
on the P&G board.110 
With the prosecution on Gupta, as the prosecutor lacked direct 
wiretaps, the prosecutor used tools for traditional insider trading 
cases by matching up phone calls and trades and the timing of the 
meetings. In other words, they based on circumstantial evidences of 
well-timed phone calls and trading based on material events. An-
other circumstantial evidence adopted by the indictment was Gupta 
had invested US$2.4 million in at least two Galleon offshore funds 
and put US$10 million into a venture with Rajaratnam called Voy-
ager Capital Partners and committed US$22.5 million to a fund 
they built that focused on emerging markets in Asia. 11 ' In other 
words, a motive can be established from Gupta in providing tips for 
Rajaratnam as his investment \vith Rajaratnam could help him 
108. Patricia Hurtado ··Gupta Took 2007 Goldman Earnings Call at Galleon, U.S. 
Says" Bloomgerg. L.P, Jan 31. 2012. 
109. U.S. v. Gupta, 11-cr-00907, U.S. District Court for Southern District of New 
York (Manhallan). 
110. SEC v. Gupta. ll-cv~7566, U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New 
York (Manhallan) 
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profit from the insider information he had access to from being the 
board member of Goldman Sachs and P&G. 
On June 2012, Gupta was found guilty on t.hree counts of se-
curities fraud and one count of conspiracy with a maximum of 20 
years in prison and acquitted him or two counts of securities 
fraud.'t 2 The prosecutor based their conviction on the argument 
that Gupta had illegally provided a virtual open line into the board 
room for his benefactor and business partner, Rajaratnam. The out-
come of this case should be regarded as a victory for the office of 
the Manhattan U.S. Attorney and FBI in their assault on insider 
trading, which used tools normally employed against organized 
crime, including phone taps and informants. Also, Gupta is the 
most prominent of those convicted at trial or to plead guilty since 
the nationwide crackdown on insider trading in October 2009. This 
conviction has sent a message that no one is off the limits. 113 
E. lmpUc:ations from These Cases 
Even though the above mentioned cases are all independent 
cases, either the defendants had relationships or the insider trading 
dealing activities they engaged in were inter-related in some way. 
As a result, this can be illustrated as the complexity of insider trad-
ing cases. On the other hand, the prosecution of the above cases can 
also serve as an indication that U.S. legal authority are now more 
focused and stringent on insider trading activities especially am.id 
the global financial crisis. 
As a result, a few important implications emerged from the 
Rajaratnam and Gupta cases that will serve as valuable insight for 
future U.S. or China insider trading cases. They are as follows: 
I. /nsid~ information and aggressiv~ research 
The Rajaratnam's case focuses on a slice of trades that pro-
duced US$20 million in alleged profits and provides a snapshot of 
network of informants and traders led by Rajaratnam. In this case, 
his <XKOnspirators included a McKinsey & Co consultant, a Intel 
Corp treasury manager and a Bear Stearns veteran. With the help 
of his insider trading ring, Rajaratnam was able to build his hedge 
fund to manage US$7 billion at its peak in 2008. Even after the 
112. l'alrieia Hurtado. David Glovin and Bob Van Vons " In Gupta. Jur()!$ Saw the 
American Dream and Convicted Anyway" Bloomberg. L.P. June 16. 2012. 
tt3. l'arlicla Hurtado. David Glovin & John Hclyar "Rnjnt Gupta Convicted of ln-
• ider Trading by U.S. Jury" Bloomberg, L.P, June IS, 201 2. 
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Internet bubble burst in 2000. Galleon's Diversified Fund climbed 
43.7% in the three year period to 2002, while the S&P 500 dropped 
37.3%.114 Before the case was discovered, Rajaratnam was consid-
ered a genius in the market, but this case proved that his profit 
making trades were helped by inside information. This is an issue 
on the violation of a perfect market. Under assumption of perfect 
market, every participant has equal access to information. As peo-
ple like Rajaratnam exist, the market is no longer fair or perfect. 
Basically, the profit advantage that Rajaratnam has was due to his 
inside information. It is based on the disadvantage on the general 
investment public. This will burt market confidence and will drasti-
cally decrease the markets competitiveness and have a detrimental 
effect on investment confidence. 
Another significant issue about the access of inside information 
is the argument that it is not illegal but only considered aggressive 
research. As every trader wants an edge on the stocks they trade, 
but there are many grey areas when it comes to aggressive research. 
The general guideline is when you trade on material, non-public 
information that comes from a company insider who is breaching its 
fiduciary duty, and then it is considered illegal and can no longer be 
considered aggressive research.115 
2. Employees and price sensitive information 
Another important implication that arises from this case is the 
investigation on insider trading by Galleon Group and technology 
executives such as Intel and iBM may prompt Silicon Valley com-
panies to clamp down on how employees handle sensitive financial 
information. These companies realize that they should make sure 
their employees understand the rules of insider trading on what 
they can and cannot talk about in regards to sensitive financial 
information.116 
As for the companies who have employees or ex-employees 
involved in this as either being arrested or turned into witnesses 
such as Polycom, AMD and Intel, they all revised and reinforced 
their insider trading rules and policies with their employees. For 
Polycom, their CEO sent e-mails to all employees reminding them 
of the rules against divulging confidential insider information. They 
114. Katherine Burton & S..oJ<l Kisban "Raj Rajaratnam Became Billionaire De-
mandoog Edge" Bloomberg. t..P. October 19, 2009. 
liS. Ibid. 
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also review their existing policy to see if there are further enhance-
ments to be made. As for AMD, they consistently remind employ-
ees to manage confidential information properly. For Intel, 
employees who deal with material information receive training on 
at least an annual basis.117 
As illustrated by these cases, many technology companies are 
involved with inside information as they provide a target for people 
to make use of insider information because their share price move-
ments tend to be more volatile compared to other industries such as 
food or utilities. This fact may push the technology companies to 
ensure their staff and employees are familiar with policies about 
how to handle financial information. 
3. Issues for the hedge fund on wiretaps 
The uncovering of Bernard Madoffs US$65 billion Ponzi 
scheme had increased the financial regulations for hedge funds, but 
this case provided a new concern for the hedge fund as they real-
ized they may get caught on tape as the government expands use of 
wiretaps to ferret out insider trading. The Rajaratnam case is the 
first time prosecutors used secretly recorded phone conversation 
against hedge funds. 118 
As Rajaratnam regularly talked to hundreds of contacts, in-
cluding other hedge fund traders, his arrest rattled hedge fund man-
agers who were questioning whether legitimate discussions caught 
on tbe tapped line will draw scrutiny to their conversations. Also, a 
broader fear concerned the hedge fund manager as whose phones 
are being monitored as prosecutors and SEC continues their 
probes, as the word wiretap struck fear in everyone even the inno-
cent. The hedge fund executives instructed their colleagues to be 
extra careful about what they say on the phone, not because they 
are breaking the law, but because they are fearful that any conver-
sation about stocks could be misconstrued.1' 9 
On the other hand, prosecutors argue that they turned to wire-
taps because of the ease hedge funds can hide when trades were 
based on illegal tips as it was always difficult to establish the exis-
tence of insider trading from the prosecutor's side. As illustrated in 
this case, Rajaratnam bad instructed others to fabricate e-mail trials 
117. Ibid. 
118. Kfttherine Burton & David Olovin "Galleon Wlretnp.• Rattle Hedge Fund as 
Insider 1 rod ina Targeted" Bloomberg. l.P, October 26,2009. 
119. Ibid 
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that would explain why they executed the illegal trade.120 As a re· 
suit, e-mails have become ineffective in investigating insider trad· 
ing. That is the reason that prosecutor had turned to phone 
wiretaps to nail down important hedge fund managers such as 
Rajaratnam. T his is because phone wiretaps provide information 
that is in real time and hard to manipulate by the defendant. 
As wiretaps were adopted for the prosecution on Rajaratnam 
and his trading ring, there is a concern that wiretaps would be re· 
quired for future success in prosecuting insider trading cases. The 
jury may expect wiretaps to be present as concrete evidence for es· 
tablishing insider trading cases. On the other hand, the growing fear 
in wiretaps will force the hedge fund industry to improve their trad· 
ing mechanism in order to pass the threat on wiretaps. As indicated 
by the Rajaratnam's case, trading from insider trading tips does al-
low a fund to make a handsome profit irregardless of the weak 
global financial market. As a result, the profitable incentive for in· 
sider trading does exists, so there will always be a huge temptation 
for hedge funds managers to continue to work on their insider in· 
formation edges to get ahead from their trading peers and avoid the 
scrutiny of regulatory bodies such as the SEC. 
4. Circumstantial ~vidence adopted for conviction 
As for the case regarding Gupta, prosecutor adopted circum-
stantial evidence for his indictment. The risk for this traditional in· 
sider cases investigation is Gupta's defense may offer alternative 
explanations for the contacts and calls between Gupta and 
Rajaratnam as they are both family friends and business partners. 
From Gupta's defense, they claimed Gupta called Rajaratnam was 
to obtain information about his investment in the Voyager Fund 
managed by Rajaratnam. 121 From the prosecutor's perspective, they 
bebeve Gupta provided the inside information to Rajaratnam be-
cause of his friendship and business relationship with Rajaratnam. 
On the other hand, Gupta benefited from Rajaratnam capital com-
mitment to and position as a limited partner of the US$22.5 million 
private equity fund they had.122 
On the other hand, Gupta was still found guilty and convicted 
based on circumstantial evidence as the jurors became convinced of 
120. /but 
121. David Glovin, David Voreaeos & Pa1ricia Hunado "Gup1a c- Buill on Cir-
eu~mtanual Proof May Help Dd<rt<e" Bloomberg. LP, Oclober 27. 2011. 
t22. Palricia Hunado ·Gupla Tool 2007 Goldman Eamonp Call 11 Galleon. U.S. 
Sa)> Bloomgerg. LP. Jan ~I. 2012. 
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Gupta's guilt after they examined the late-in-the-day timing of 
phone calls to Rajaratnam and the trades be made immediately af-
terwards. In other words, it was the information and actions take 
was the focus. The phone call records showed that Gupta called 
Rajaratnam just minutes before the end of trading and Galleon 
fund managers purchased 217,200 shares of Goldman Sachs stock 
just two minutes before the market closed.123 
As a result, the success of the conviction of Gupta based on 
circumstantial evidence showed the U.S. financial regulator and le-
gal authorities decided in widening the scope on eliminating insider 
trading activities in the financial markeL This more stringent ap-
proach will make insider trading activities more difficult to bide 
under the flag of coincidences, because coincidences will no longer 
be regarded as an effective excuse in persuading jurors that insider 
trading activities had not taken place. 
5. Penalty should be triple to the gain 
The federal judge ordered Rajaratnam to pay US$92.8 million 
in the case brought by the SEC, this is because SEC argued that 
Rajaratnam's penalty in lawsuit should be triple to more than 
US$94 million, an amount based on his gains and losses avoid 
through trades in 6ve stocks after receiving i.nside information. The 
court ruling agreed with the SEC that Rajaratnam's crime deserved 
triple civil damages.12A This is because the SEC penalties were "de-
signed to make such unlawful trading a money losing preposition, 
not only just for this defendant, but for all who would consider it, 
by showing if you get caught, you are going to pay severely in mon-
etary terms".125 
In another words, the US regulators bad inclined towards se-
vere penalties to discourage insider trading from taking place in the 
first place. This is because regardless of using wiretaps or circum-
stantial evidence, insider trading is difficult and timely to catch in 
the first place. If a penalty can serve as an effective tool to decrease 
chances of insider trading taking place, this should be considered an 
effective approach for limiting and decreasing the harm that insider 
trading imposes on the general financial market. 
123. Patricia Hurtado, David Olovin and Bob Van Voris "In Oupla. Juron Saw tbe 
American Dream and Conviclcd Anyway• BloomberJ. L..P. June 16. 2012. 
124. Patricia Hurtado "RaJinllnam Must Pay $92.8 rrullion on SEC Case. Jud&e 
Rules" Bloombera. L..P. November 8. 2011. 
125. SEC v. Rajantnam. Olk\--8811, U.S. District Court. Southern D.strict of New 
York (Manhauaa). 
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6. Hedge fund lawsui1 risk rises as insurance companies are 
quoling coverage 
Since the hedge fund risk of lawsuit is rising after regulatory 
probes of insider trading at Galleon Group, insurers are quoting 
rates that are 5 to lOo/o higher for coverage that protect hedge funds 
against government investigations and investor lawsuits, after two 
years of rate declines. A hedge fund with US$200 million in assets 
under management seeking US$5 million of coverage could Eay 
about US$75,000, up from less that US$70,000 six months ago. 26 
This type of professional liability coverage pays a hedge fund's 
legal expenses if employees are the subject of a regulatory probe or 
legal action by government or investors. The policies are triggered 
once allegations are made, and before fault has been determined. 
On the other hand, insurers can deny or try to claw back claims 
payments if policy terms are violated. In practice, most hedge funds 
allocate the costs of coverage to investors.127 
In regards to this type of insurance policies, it is still the inves-
tors paying for the cost of the fund manager's wrong doing. Once 
the policies are triggered by a regulatory probe or legal action by 
government or investors, it is the hedge fund being paid by the in-
surer and it is investors who are actually paying for these policies. 
As a result, this type of insurance policy is actually a way to protect 
hedge fund managers in doing insider trading. Once they are inves-
tigated by the regulator, they can still get coverage from the insurer 
at the expense of investors. As a result, this is an indication on how 
Wall Street and financial professionals are able to use advance fi-
nancial mechanisms to protect themselves against investigations 
and investor claims. In other words, the government regulators 
should also look into this type of insurance coverage to prevent 
hedge fund managers from hedging away all their risks toward reg-
ulators and investors. 
lX. CONCLUSION 
In general, the issues for China's insider trading situation ex-
amined alone or compared with the U.S. could be concluded as 
follows. 
In recent years as insider trading cases have grown exponen-
tially in China, Chinese regulators have recogni1-ed their need to 
126. Noah Bubayar "Hedge Fund> LII"Wt Risk Rises Afl<r Galleon Probe" Bloom· 
berc. L.P. March 14. 2012. 
121. tbod. 
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improve their regulations in regulating the securities market and 
restrict the occurrence of insider trading. As a result, they intro-
duced several new measures and rules in recent years in regulating 
the securities market. For example, they introduced Interim Provi-
sions on the Securities Investment Advisor Business, Tentative Pro-
visions for Issuance of Securities-related Research Reports and 
Interim Provisions on the Release of Securities Research Reports 
in 2010. In September 2011, they adopted Decision on Revising the 
Relevant Provisions on Major Asset Reorganization and Support-
ing Financing for Listed Companies, Administrative Measures for 
Material Assets Reorganization of Listed Companies, the Release 
of Suggestions on Strengthening the Supervision of Listed Compa-
nies, the Administrative Measures for the Takeover of Listed Com-
panies, Measures for the Administration of Disclosure of 
Shareholder Equity Changes of Listed Companies, Administrative 
Measures for Material Assets Reorganization of Listed Companies 
and Regularizing the Information Disclosure of Listed Companies 
and Behaviors of Relevant Parties. Also, in May 2012, they intro-
duced Interpretation on Several Issues Concerning the Specific Ap-
plication of Law in Handling the Criminal Cases of Insider Trading 
and Divulgement of Insider Information. In other words, China has 
tried very hard to improve their insider trading regulatory system. 
On the other hand, as China's equity market is still a developing 
market, China's regulatory system is also on an ongoing iniprov-
ment process. 
In the past, China has been criticized that their penalties are 
too light in regards to crimes resulting from insider trading. As in-
sider trading could lead to enormous profit gain, a light penalty 
served to be ineffective in curbing insider trading. As a result, 
China in recent years has also improved this aspect. They increased 
their penalty against insider trading. For example, the case of 
Qingdao Kingking and Guoyuan Securities, its two defendants are 
Shiao Shih Ching and Wang Yi had both sentenced death parole 
and Shiao with returning unlawful profit of RMB$72.5 million. 
Even though a heavy penalty is not an effective mechanism in ex-
tinguishing insider trading from taking place, without it, it could 
make insider trading take place without a fear factor. 
A. Compare China with the United States 
After examining the insider trading situation in China and U.S. 
in recent years, we can see that the both economies are at different 
stages of developing their insider trading regulatory mechanism. 
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1. U.S. Perspective 
Since the U.S. equity market is a very mature market with a 
long history in addressing insider trading, for example its related 
regulations were introduced as early as 1920s, its problem leading 
to recent insider trading is a people issue. Despite its comprehen-
sive regulatory mechanism, people's greed and desire for more than 
normal profit has led to insider trading to occur in recent years. 
Rajarnanrun and Gupta are both financial elites controlling both a 
popular fund house (Galleon) and a major U.S. financial institution 
(Goldman Sachs), but their positions did not binder them from en-
gaging in insider trading. In other words, it's the human issue in 
insider trading that will be the most difficult to address. This is also 
the reason why U.S. regulators engaged in a method that usually 
deals with drug dealers or criminals in investigating insider trading 
in the cases above. This is because insider trading in a sense is as 
harmful as a drug problem. Insider trading is the drug problem in 
the financial market. 
2. China's Perspective 
In China's case, it is still at the stage of needing more compre-
hensive insider trading regulations in targeting its insider trading 
dealing resulted from shell listing or amphibian officers. Once 
China improves their insider trading regulatory framework, then 
they will gradually have to address the human issue in insider trad-
ing just as the United States is today. They may also have to ac-
knowledge insider trading is as harmful to its financial market as a 
drug problem is to human beings. At that stage, they may also have 
to broaden their evidence collection mechanism to insider trading 
such as wiretaps or circumstantial evidence as is the case with the 
Unites States in recent years. 
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